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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Economics of Energy and Transportation 
 
 
by 
 
 
Ryan N. Barnes, Doctor of Economics 
 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Ryan Bosworth 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
 
Natural gas is a fuel that can be used for transportation. It has many desirable 
properties, for example, it is generally less expensive and less carbon intensive than 
conventional fuel. Research was conducted to ascertain the viability of natural gas as a 
consumer transportation fuel. The extent to which the price of natural gas has decoupled 
from the price of oil was investigated. The price of natural gas was found to have 
significantly deviated from the price of oil on an energy parity basis; however, this new 
regime was found to be unstable. As a counter point to this finding international trade in 
natural gas was found to be increasing, and the growth of an international market for 
natural gas appears to be emerging. A model of natural gas vehicle adoption was then 
developed at the consumer level. Given the baseline parameter values in the model, 
significant adoption of natural gas vehicles appears to be unlikely. The model was then 
extended to understand the role that natural gas could play in the abatement of Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2). Due to the low predicted adoption of natural gas vehicles the predicted 
abatement of CO2 from natural gas vehicles was also low. Furthermore, it was found by 
simulating various policy regimes that were designed to encourage natural gas vehicle 
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adoption that these policies were a relatively expensive way to abate CO2 emissions.   The 
main conclusion drawn from this research is that despite the attractiveness of many of the 
qualities of using natural gas as a transportation fuel, namely lower fuel prices and lower 
CO2 emissions policy makers should not encourage the adoption of natural gas as a 
transportation fuel. 
 
 
 (131 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
Essays on the Economics of Energy and Transportation 
Ryan N. Barnes 
 
 
The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) is responsible for 
planning, operating, and maintaining a highway network consisting of over 18,500 lane-
miles of highway. In recent years the growing uncertainty about oil prices and availability 
has made long-range transportation planning even more challenging. Rather than relying 
on trend extrapolation, this study uses market mechanisms to shed light on key long-range 
transportation planning assumptions. In particular, this study was conducted to help 
WSDOT assess the likelihood that natural gas will substitute for petroleum fuels and 
estimate the impacts that changes in fuel prices will have on natural gas vehicle demand, 
fuel consumption, and Greenhouse Gas emissions. 
 The main findings of this project were that there is an unstable price difference per 
unit of energy between natural gas and oil. This price difference accounts for the relative 
attractiveness of natural gas as a transportation fuel. Furthermore, an international market 
for natural gas is emerging due to the international trade in liquefied natural gas. Despite 
these potential benefits the market has created for the use of natural gas as transportation 
fuel, our model still predicts that consumers will not adopt natural gas vehicles. Due to the 
low adoption of natural gas vehicles, pollution abatement policies designed around 
increasing adoption of natural gas vehicles is likely to be very expensive. 
.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THEMATIC CONTENT 
1.1. Introduction 
 Natural gas is a fuel whose price has fallen relative to other fuels. It is natural to 
start to think of new uses for this fuel as consumers and energy producers try to substitute 
to this fuel. Rather than just being used for electricity generation and heating, natural gas 
is increasingly being used as a transportation fuel in the commercial and consumer vehicle 
fleets. It raises the question of what role natural gas is going to play long-term in the vehicle 
fleet. 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain whether or not Natural Gas 
Vehicles (NGVs) are an economically viable alternative fuel vehicle. The question is 
motivated by policy questions such as: should policy makers invest in infrastructure to 
support consumers with NGVs? Will consumers purchase NGVs without financial 
incentives from policy makers? And, how cost effective is it to use NGVs to abate carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions?  
In the sense that these policy questions are motivated by a lack of coverage in the 
academic literature, this dissertation seeks to fill those gaps. Often the literature only 
tangentially addresses these policy questions.  The next section expands on this idea and 
highlights some of the main gaps in the literature that motivate each chapter of the 
dissertation. Therefore, although this dissertation is mainly motivated by policy questions, 
it is also motivated by gaps in the literatures that give rise to these questions. 
The dissertation is divided into two main sections which are sub-divided into two 
chapters each. The first section is an empirical investigation into the macro-effects that 
affect the price of natural gas. The second section analyzes a micro-level model of a 
consumer making the choice of whether or not to purchase a NGV. Each chapter deals 
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with a unique but related research problem. The first chapter looks at the relationship 
between the price of natural gas and the price of oil. The second chapter investigates the 
role that liquefied natural gas (LNG) plays in uniting regional natural gas markets into one 
global market for natural gas. Using these two studies as a backdrop for the case for using 
natural gas as a transportation fuel, the following chapter presents the basic consumer 
model of this dissertation. This model is used to predict current adoption of NGVs under 
various price scenarios. The final main chapter of this dissertation then uses this model to 
calculate the marginal abatement costs of NGV technology on CO2 emissions. Three 
policy regimes are examined. 
1.2. Relationship to Literature  
The dissertation fills a small gap in the literature. Specifically, each chapter fills in 
a different portion of the gap. The first two chapters look at the macro-market for natural 
gas to provide a backdrop for the next two chapters.  The last two chapters specifically 
answer the main research question of this dissertation.  
The first chapter looks into the relationship between the price of oil and natural 
gas. This relationship has been explored by various researchers attempting to determine 
if the price of oil and natural gas have become decoupled from each other. Various 
researchers have found that the price of natural gas is governed by the price of oil (Brown 
& Yücel, 2008; Mohammadi, 2011; Regnard & Zakoïan, 2011). However, Ramberg and 
Parsons (2012) show that much of the volatility between the long-run relationship between 
oil and natural gas can be accounted for by allowing for structural breaks in the 
cointegration relationship. In a similar vein this chapter looks for structural breaks in the 
relationship between oil and natural gas by using a recursive Gregory-Hansen test 
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(Gregory & Hansen, 1996). This chapter of the dissertation fills in a small portion of the 
literature by using this test to detect structural breaks in the co-integrating relationship 
between oil and natural gas.   
The next chapter looks at the question of whether or not a single global market is 
emerging for natural gas, or if it will continue to be governed by the oil market. This study 
fits into the literature concerned with price integration between regional natural gas 
markets and the role that LNG has played in this integration (Brown & Yücel, 2009; 
Nuemann 2012; Neumann, Siliverstovs, & von Hirschhausen, 2006; Siliverstovs 
L’Hégaret, Neumann, & von Hirschhausen, 2005). However, the key difference between 
the model presented in this chapter and this vein of literature is the novel use of the gravity 
model to determine the role that LNG plays in the global natrual gas market. This chapter 
concluded that natural gas markets are becoming less regional and that a separate global 
natural gas market is emerging (Jensen, 2004) due primarily to trade in LNG. 
The next chapter answers the question of what types of adoption rates can be 
expected for NGV vehicles amongst consumers. This chapter contributes to the set of the 
literature that deals with the adoption of NGVs. Staub (2013) gives an overview of the use 
of natural gas in transportation. Deal (2012) studies the conditions under which firms 
would be willing to adopt NGVs. Walls (1996) values various attributes unique to natural 
gas. Matic (2005) looks at the opportunities to use natural gas as a transportation fuel. 
This chapter contributes to this literature by predicting the adoption rate of NGVs by 
consumers under different price conditions. The main findings of this chapter are that 
adoption rates are low and will likely continue to be low. 
The final chapter examines the question of whether policy makers should 
encourage the adoption of NGVs to reduce GHG emissions. Specifically, this chapter 
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narrowly focuses on CO2 emissions. It is similar to other studies that estimate the marginal 
abatement cost of CO2 under various abatement mechanisms. For example, Li, Linn, and 
Spiller (2013) and Knittel (2009) investigate the marginal abatement cost of cash for 
clunkers. Kok, Annema, and van Wee (2011) and Kesicki (2012) find the marginal 
abatement cost for electric vehicles. And Bernesteanu and Li (2011) look at hybrid electric 
vehicles. This chapter finds that in comparison to these studies NGVs have a marginal 
abatement cost that are orders of magnitude greater than these studies. This indicates 
that NGVs are an inefficeint CO2 abatement technology. This chapter adds to this 
literature by giving an estimate of the marginal abatement costs for NGVs. 
This small sampling of the literature is only meant to illustrate how each chapter of 
this dissertation fits in with the overall theme of the dissertation and highlight the main 
differences between that chapter and the studies described thus far in those studies. Other 
portions of the relevant literature will be discussed at length with more detail in the 
constituent chapters of this dissertation, as well as how that chapter fits in with that 
literature. 
1.3. Data Collection and Methodology 
Data were obtained from various sources during the course of this research. The 
data were obtained in order to answer different research questions. The first two chapters 
use the different data sets, and the last two chapters use a common third dataset.  
The first main chapter of the dissertation makes use of daily spot price data. Time 
series for oil and natural gas were collected. This data was obtained from the Energy 
Information Agency (2014). Cushing, OK WTI spot prices are used for oil, and Henry Hub 
spot prices are used for the natural gas prices. The sample period used in this study is 
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January 7, 1997 to April 14, 2014.  Since natural gas is less energy dense than oil, the 
price of both commodities is measured in USD per MMBtu (million BTUs). This unit of 
measure ensures that the prices are being compared on an energy parity basis because 
the prices of both commodities are using the same unit of measure. 
A recursive Gregory-Hansen test (Gregory & Hansen, 1996) was then used on this 
data to determine the stability of the long-run cointegrating relationship between the price 
of oil and natural gas. The Gregory-Hansen test looks for a single structural break at an 
unknown time. By applying the test recursively over a rolling window, I identify multiple 
structural breaks at various times. 
The next chapter utilizes data that were collected from three main sources. First, 
trade data for natural gas and liquefied natural gas were obtained from the U.N.’s 
comtrade database in a panel of 92 countries over 20 years.  Second source of data that 
was used came from the World Bank’s database of World Development Indicators. This 
data was used to augment the trade data with national demographic data such as GDP, 
unemployment rate, percentage of land protected by government, inter alia. The final data 
source was the latitude and longitudes of each of the capital cities of the 92 countries were 
obtained. From this data the great circle distance between the any two capital cities were 
calculated. These three datasets were then merged by using the importing and exporting 
countries as identifiers for the merging. 
The resultant dataset is then analyzed with a gravity model over the panel. Various 
estimating models are used including a random effects model, a random effects model 
with an AR(1) process, a pooled model, and a Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
model (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011). Each of these estimating models produced results 
that were consistent with each other. Cross-equation restrictions were tested on the 
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distance variables to see if LNG has had a significant effect on the natural gas market as 
a whole.  
 The final dataset used in this dissertation comes from the National Highway Travel 
Survey of 2009. This data was used to identify the population of vehicles on the road along 
two variables, miles per gallon (MPG) and vehicle miles travelled per year (VMT). We use 
a discretized distribution of these two variables to determine the probability that a vehicle 
will have a particular VMT and MPG. Using this data along with assumption about prices 
we created a model that could generate the adoption rate of natural gas vehicles. 
Using the adoption rates from this model, the CO2 emissions for the vehicle fleet 
could be estimated. In the last chapter, of the dissertation I show how these emissions 
can be calculated from this adoption rate model. By substituting different price differences 
in the model, various policy scenarios can be counterfactually simulated to see what effect 
these scenarios would have on CO2 emissions. 
1.4. Practical Significance 
This dissertation is aimed at answering basic policy questions about the adoption 
of NGVs. Specifically, the questions that it answers are first, what macro-effects might 
encourage the adoption of NGVs? Second, how will consumers behave individually in 
response to this price difference? 
Therefore, the first half of this dissertation looks at two macro-effects that may 
contribute to the increased demand for NGVs. First, the price of natural gas is significantly 
less than oil on an energy parity basis. The first chapter looks into the question of whether 
or not this price difference is likely to persist. This chapter investigates this question mainly 
by looking at the stability of the relationship between the prices of the two commodities. 
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The next chapter investigates whether global demand for natural gas is likely to increase 
or decrease. This chapter investigates this question through the use of a gravity model. 
This study is designed to see whether or not the natural gas market is more integrated 
due to the trade of LNG. 
The next two chapters take more of a micro-approach. The model presented in the 
third chapter and used in the fourth focuses on the financial choice of whether to buy a 
NGV or not. This model may be able to generalize to other alternative fuel vehicles. This 
model can be used to estimate the adoption rate of NGVs, and the effect that different 
policy regimes will have on the adoption rate, and thus emissions as well. Policy makers 
should be interested in these two chapters, because they show what the adoption rate of 
NGVs would be with and without their intervention. Furthermore, the final chapter shows 
what the cost of intervention in terms of abating CO2 emissions would be. 
The significance of this study is that it will provide policy makers with a road map 
that can be used to make decisions about NGVs. In particular, throughout this dissertation 
I will show that although NGVs have many attractive features, such as low fuel costs that 
may persist into the future, and an emerging global market, NGVs do not make sense for 
most consumers. Furthermore, the cost to use NGVs as an abatement technology is much 
larger than similar programs designed to reduce CO2 emissions. From this exploration of 
the topic, it is clear that the potential benefits of encouraging adoption rarely outweigh the 
costs. Thus policy makers may not want to encourage the adoption of NGVs. 
1.5. Limitations 
Although throughout this dissertation my main argument is that policy makers may 
not want to incentivize consumers to purchase NGVs, a fully definitive answer to this 
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question is likely impossible. Each of the chapters in this dissertation answers only a small 
part of this question and one could make a career out of cataloging every aspect of this 
problem.  
The data used to answer these research questions primarily comes from the 
United States of America, with the notable exception of trade data from multiple countries. 
It is entirely possible that the conclusions that will be drawn from this dissertation is 
idiosyncratic to the United States, and will not generalize well to other countries. For 
example, Iran and Pakistan both have significant adoption of NGVs. Data from the United 
States which predicts a very low adoption rate obviously does not generalize to these 
countries. 
 Another aspect of the data is that it must be viewed within the context of the last 
few years. Much has changed in terms of what is possible in the extraction of natural gas. 
Further technological developments may change the nature of the problem. Advances in 
vehicle technology particularly would have a great impact on the outcomes of these 
problems. 
 Furthermore, the research detailed in this dissertation cannot fully circumscribe the 
research problems. For example, in the course of conducting this research further 
questions about the role that weather plays on international trade of natural gas were 
raised. Additionally, the inconvenience premium uses an estimate from Walls (1996) which 
was adjusted for inflation. The question of what this inconvenience premium is remains an 
open issue. One could devise further studies into this aspect of the literature and spend 
considerable effort on estimating the inconvenience premium. Other literatures were 
drawn upon, and some of the research benefited from these literatures. The literature on 
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the rebound effect was particularly useful; see Sorrell and Dimitropolos (2008) for a review 
of this literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DETECTING STRUCTURAL BREAKS IN THE COINTEGRATING RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRICES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The relationship between oil and natural gas is of interest to various stakeholders. 
For example commodity traders may base a trading strategy on this relationship. 
Businesses in the energy sector may make significant investments in extracting one 
resource over the other based on the current and projected relationship between oil and 
natural gas. Policy makers need to understand this relationship to design efficacious 
energy programs. These stakeholders need to recognize whether changes to this 
relationship are temporary or permanent. This study identifies that a permanent structural 
break has occurred from the historical relationship of oil and natural gas. Two pricing 
regimes are identified, and analyzed separately. 
Compared to the old regime, this new regime identified in this study can be 
characterized by a larger relative price between oil and natural gas. The change in relative 
price appears to be driven mainly by the recent decline in the price of natural gas. This 
decline has been attributed to recent developments in the technology to extract natural 
gas (Rogers, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the new regime exhibits much less price volatility than in the previous 
regime. The decline in price volatility is not just limited to one commodity. Both oil and 
natural gas experience significantly less volatility than in the previous regime. The 
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decrease in price volatility of both goods is likely due to the decrease in volatility of oil 
prices, based on oil’s role as a mediating good in the natural gas market.   
 The most prominent similarity between both regimes is the instability of the long-
run price relationship between oil and natural gas. The instability of this long-run 
relationship accounts for the regime switch that occurred. The gradual separation of the 
natural gas market from the oil market likely contributed to the switch to this new long-run 
equilibrium. This new long-run equilibrium should not be viewed as a complete decoupling 
from the oil market. As the independent natural gas market continues to mature, the 
instability of the new regime is likely to result in the relationship between oil and natural 
gas to reach different long-run equilibria. 
 The findings presented in this paper support the hypothesis of a weakly integrated 
energy market. However, the long-run relative prices and the volatility of prices in this 
integrated market are unstable. Indeed, a fundamental shift has occurred in the energy 
market during the period of this study. The analysis in this study has identified verifiable 
differences between the old price regime and the new one.  
2.2. Previous Literature 
Policy makers need to have a careful understanding of the price relationships 
between various energy sources to make informed decisions (Yücel & Guo, 1994). 
Historically, the relationship between oil and natural gas prices has been dominated 
mainly by the shocks to the oil market (Mohammadi, 2011) (Regnard & Zakoïan, 2011) 
(Brown & Yücel, 2008). This relationship persisted despite the fact that oil is an 
internationally traded good, while natural gas is a regionally traded good although it is 
rapidly integrating into one world market (Siliverstovs, L’Hégaret, Neumann, & von 
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Hirschhausen, 2005). The current study examines evidence of a recent change to the 
long-run relationship between oil and natural gas prices. This change could call into 
question the idea of an integrated energy market. 
Mohammadi (2011) finds evidence that the natural gas market is influenced by the 
oil market, but that the oil market is not influenced by the natural gas market. He also finds 
that neither of these commodities influences the coal market. Regnard and Zakoïan (2011) 
also find that oil and natural gas prices are cointegrated, but that much of the volatility in 
natural gas prices is determined by outdoor temperature. Brown and Yücel (2008) also 
find a stable long-term relationship between oil and natural gas. Their results indicate that 
the tie between natural gas and oil is primarily due to substitution and competition between 
natural gas and petroleum products. These studies, inter alia, provide the basis for a 
weakly integrated energy market with limited substitutability between different fuel types. 
Recently, the historical stability of the relationship between oil and natural gas prices 
has been called into question. A process of price decoupling has been observed. Erdős 
(2012) finds that oil and natural gas prices have decoupled since early 2009. He also finds 
that oil prices influence natural gas prices only in the pre-2009 period. He fails to find 
evidence of a recoupling. Ramberg and Parsons (2012) document that although simple 
cointegrating relationships between oil and natural gas can be useful much of the volatility 
in these prices is left unexplained by simple formulaic relationships. They show that a 
modest improvement in the predictive power of these simple formulas can be achieved by 
allowing for structural breaks in the relationship. 
The present study contributes to this literature by using more recent data to identify 
the date of a regime change from the previous long-term equilibrium to a new one. 
Separate models for each regime are run to identify key differences between each regime. 
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Finally, the stability of the new regime is tested to determine whether this new price regime 
is likely to persist over time. 
2.3. Data 
The data consists of daily spot prices for oil and natural gas. Cushing, OK West 
Texas Intermediate Oil (the underlying commodity for oil traded in futures markets on the 
New York Mercantile Exchange) spot prices are used for oil, and Henry Hub (a distribution 
hub of the natural gas pipeline system located in Louisiana) spot prices are used for the 
natural gas prices. The sample period used in this study is January 7, 1997 to April 14, 
2014. Prices were obtained from the Energy Information Administration (Energy 
Information Administration, 2014). Natural gas is less energy dense than oil. In order to 
make price comparisons between oil and natural gas meaningful, the price of both 
commodities is measured in USD per MMBtu (million BTUs). This unit of measure ensures 
that the prices are being compared on an energy parity basis. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the historical energy prices. A tight relationship existed between 
the price of oil and natural gas. From a visual inspection it appears that this tight 
relationship persisted until the early part of 2009. This tight relationship suggests that there 
was probably a single market for energy in the United States. After 2009, it appears as 
though there is a fundamental change in how natural gas is priced relative to oil. This 
apparent fundamental shift provides the motivation for the analysis that follows. 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for each of the two price series. Summary 
statistics for the ratio (oil to natural gas) of the two prices is also reported. The average 
price of oil over the sample period was $9.60/MMBtu. The average price of natural gas 
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Figure 2.1. Price of oil and natural gas over time 
  
 
over the sample was slightly above what would be implied by taking the ratio of the 
averages. The average relative price was 2.26 ($ oil/$ natural gas). 
A prerequisite for a cointegration relationship between oil and natural gas is that 
both time series have unit roots. Although well established in the literature that these price 
series have unit roots (Brown & Yücel, 2008; Mohammadi, 2011; Ramberg & Parsons, 
2012; Siliverstovs et al., 2005), the oil and natural gas price series are tested for unit roots. 
The results of various tests for unit roots are presented in Table 2.2.  The null hypothesis 
for these tests is that the series contains a unit root. None of the test statistics are 
significant at the 5% level. However, weak evidence exist that natural gas prices may not 
have a unit root. The ADF test statistic for natural gas is significant at the 10% level. At 
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Table 2.1. Energy Price Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Description 
Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Cushingbtu 
The price of 1 million BTUs of WTI oil as 
measured at Cushing, OK. ($/MMBtu) 
9.60 
(5.46) 
HenryHub 
The price of 1 million BTUs of natural gas as 
measured at Henry Hub. ($/MMBtu) 
4.70 
(2.33) 
Ratio 
The Relative Price of Oil to Natural Gas. 
This price is calculated as the ratio of the 
two prices above. 
2.26 
(1.53) 
 
 
Table 2.2. Unit-Root Test Results  
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
WTI (Cushing, OK) -0.011 0.232 
Henry Hub -1.854* -1.484 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
2.4. Results and Discussion 
A Gregory-Hansen (Gregory & Hansen, 1996) test is used to determine whether or 
not a structural break occurred, and if so, when the break occurred. Table 2.3 presents 
the results of this test. These results clearly indicate a regime switch occurred between 
April, 27 2009 and July 6, 2009. Anecdotally, the shift occurred approximately at the same 
time that horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing began to be widely utilized (Rogers, 
2011). Furthermore, the decline in the capability to substitute quickly between distillate 
fuel oil and natural gas may have also played a role (Brown & Yücel, 2008). Any inference 
that these technological changes were the cause of this disruption would be pure 
speculation without further data to support this claim. 
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Table 2.3. Results of Gregory-Hansen Test  
 Test Statistic Break Point (Date) Break Point (Obs) 
ADF -5.11** July 6, 2009 3120 
Z(t) -4.81* April 27, 2009 3072 
Z(a) -60.31*** April 27, 2009 3072 
*, **, *** indicate 10% 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
The standard deviation for both price series decreased significantly after the 
regime switch. Classical variance ratio tests were conducted on both price series. This 
test is an F-test, with 3070 and 1252 degrees of freedom for both price series. The test 
statistic is the ratio of the standard deviation before and after the regime switch. Natural 
gas prices were 9.32 (p=0.00) times more variable before the regime switch. Oil prices 
were 4.81 (p=0.00) times more variable before the regime switch. 
 The relative price of oil to natural gas over the entire period of study was 2.26 ($ 
oil/$ natural gas). This overall average obscures the important differences between the 
regimes. Prior to the regime switch the average relative price of oil to natural gas was 1.43 
($ oil/$ natural gas), and 4.29 ($ oil/$ natural gas) afterwards. A standard t-test with 
unequal variances indicates (t=105.93) that there was a change in the relative price of oil 
to natural gas due to the structural break. 
 These classical tests seem to imply that the markets for oil and natural gas have 
become decoupled since the structural break. They also suggest that since the regime 
switch the volatility of both oil and natural gas prices has decreased. These classical 
hypothesis tests do not account for the temporal nature of the data. The conclusions that 
we can draw from these tests may be spurious.  
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To confirm these findings, vector error correction models (VECM) were conducted 
on subsamples of the data (before and after the structural break). The cointegrating 
vectors for these VECMs are reported in Table 2.4. These cointegrating vectors capture 
the long-run relative prices of oil to natural gas. They differ from the average values 
reported above because these vectors account for the time series nature of the data. The 
average relative prices are also reported in this table for comparison. Before the structural 
break the long-run relative price of oil to natural gas was 1.59 ($ oil/$ natural gas). This 
ratio would imply a pricing rule of thumb near the 10:1 (barrels of oil to MMBtus of natural 
gas) rule. After the regime switch the long-run relative price of oil to natural gas was 4.31 
($ oil/$ natural gas) which would imply a pricing rule closer to 26:1. 
These long-run relative prices echo the values found for average relative prices in 
each period. This result lends further support to the idea that a fundamental shift in the 
way energy is priced has occurred, namely that the relative price of oil to natural gas has 
shifted to a new long-run equilibrium. The long-run relative price of oil to natural gas has 
increased approximately 171% over its previous long-run relative price. 
In order to determine whether this new normal constitutes a fundamental shift from 
the organization of the oil and natural gas markets, the impact parameters are analyzed. 
The adjustment parameters for the VECMs are reported in Table 2.5.   The parameters 
before the structural break show that shocks in the oil market passed through to the natural 
gas market. However, shocks to natural gas did not flow through to the oil market. Also it 
is interesting to note that there is no evidence to support shocks in the natural gas market 
affecting the natural gas market. These conditions imply that the natural gas market was 
mediated mainly by the oil market during this period, and that separate markets for natural 
gas and oil did not exist during this period. 
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Table 2.4. Cointegrating Vectors  
 Before Regime Change After Regime Change 
WTI (Cushing, OK) 1 
(--) 
1 
(--) 
Natural Gas (Henry Hub) -1.60*** 
(0.124) 
-4.31*** 
(0.442) 
Cointegrating vectors are normalized on WTI. *, **, *** indicate 10% 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
 
 
In the second period, the short-run adjustment parameters are significant for 
shocks in the oil market. These shocks are carried through to the natural gas market, as 
in the previous period. However, the point estimate for an oil shock’s effect on the natural 
gas market has decreased slightly from the previous period. Shocks to the natural gas 
market also now have a significant effect on the natural gas market. These shocks still do 
not have a significant effect on the oil market. These conditions imply that the natural gas 
market has become disentangled somewhat from the oil market in recent years. It appears 
that two separate markets have emerged; though, oil prices still mediate natural gas 
prices. 
These findings echo those of Brown and Yücel (2008). They found that oil prices 
help to determine the price of natural gas. These results do, however, support the 
conclusion that the market for natural gas has become less dependent on oil over time. 
This trend of disentangling the two markets is likely to continue over time. 
 The smaller adjustment parameter values in the second period indicate a decrease 
in volatility during this period. Smaller adjustment parameters imply that random shocks 
to the system do not create large swings in prices. This implies a decrease in the volatility  
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Table 2.5. Impact Parameters  
  Before Regime Change After Regime Change 
WTI Crude    
 WTI Shocks -0.0034** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0029* 
(0.0016) 
 Natural Gas 
Shocks 
0.0055** 
(0.0027) 
0.0125* 
(0.0071) 
Natural Gas    
 WTI Shocks 0.0067*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
 Natural Gas 
Shocks 
-0.0107*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0094* 
(0.0051) 
*, **, *** indicate 10% 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
of each of the price series. This decreased volatility of the prices confirms the earlier result 
from the classical variance ratio test.  
 The two markets have separated to some degree, but long run relationships still 
exist between the two commodities. The long run relationship has changed to a new 
equilibrium recently. This switch implies an inherent instability in the long run relationship. 
It calls into question the stability of the new long-run equilibrium. Table 2.6 depicts the 
eigenvalue stability condition for the VECM in the first period, and the eigenvalue stability 
condition for the second period. This condition states that the long-run relationship 
between variables is unstable if one of the normalized eigenvalues approaches unity. 
The first period is unstable. The largest eigenvalue for this period is 0.99. This 
large eigenvalue is expected given the regime switch that ended this period. The second 
period also gives a large eigenvalue of 0.98. Since this eigenvalue is close to unity, the 
long-run relationship between oil and natural gas reported above is unstable for the 
second period. 
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Table 2.6. Results from Eigenvalue Stability Test  
Before Regime Shift After Regime Shift 
0.989712 0.991748 
0.677437 0.687385 
0.677437 0.687385 
0.656644 0.675492 
0.639364 0.675492 
0.639364 0.584230 
0.638702 0.546891 
0.638702 0.546891 
0.616834 0.544420 
0.616834 0.544420 
0.609490 0.519306 
0.609490 0.519306 
0.544677 0.497113 
0.544677 0.497113 
0.072752 0.075623 
Normalized eigenvalue omitted. 
 
 
 These findings are confirmed by a recursive Gregory Hansen test. This test differs 
from the original test in that it allows for the identification of multiple structural breaks at 
unknown dates, instead of a single structural break. It allows for the examination of the 
stability of the second period. Figure 2.2 presents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
statistic for this test over time, with the 95% and 99% critical values. This test suggests 
that the structural break which this paper has examined to this point was the result of two 
separate regime changes. One occurred three months before the structural break that has 
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been examined thus far (June 2008), and the other almost five months later than the 
structural break previously examined (February 2009). 
 Figure 2.2 indicates that the long-run relationship may have recently entered into 
a period of instability. The ADF test statistic is currently significant at the 95% level. This 
result is tempered by the fact that the test statistic is not significant at the 99% level. These 
findings seem to agree with the eigenvalue stability condition. The new long-run 
relationship between the price of natural gas and oil may not persist into the future. The 
market for these commodities may be in the process of shifting to a new equilibrium. This 
test does not indicate which direction this new equilibrium will likely take, just that the price 
difference is unstable. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Stability of oil and natural gas relationship 
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As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the long-run equilibrium between the oil and 
natural gas markets is not characterized by long periods of stability. There are at least 9 
periods that can be considered unstable with 95% confidence, and 5 periods of instability 
with 99% confidence in the sample period. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the 
current instability is increasing. In the context of previous long-term relative price 
instability, the current instability is not surprising. Most likely, the instability is due to the 
gradual evolution of separate markets for oil and natural gas. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The link between oil and natural gas has, at times, been very strong. This strong link 
has given rise to various rule-of-thumb pricing measures in the energy industry, such as 
the 6:1 and 10:1 rules. The 6:1 rule, for example, simply states that one price exists 
between oil and natural gas after controlling for thermal parity. The 10:1 rule seems to 
also recognize this same fact, but it allows for price differences due to the differing 
production, transportation, and storage costs of these different fuels as well as accounting 
for the limited substitutability between them. 
 These measures have been useful in the past, but recently, the price ratio between 
a barrel of oil and one million BTUs of natural gas has departed from these historical 
relationships. This departure has called into question the reliability of these rules-of-thumb. 
When these two prices have decoupled in the past, it appears as though the break was of 
a temporary nature (Ramberg & Parsons, 2012). The duration of this recent breakaway is 
rather unprecedented, lasting nearly 5 years at the time of writing. 
 This study provides evidence that the duration of the current price separation may 
be due to a revolution in the oil and natural gas industries. Specifically, the date at which 
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the structural break occurred may indicate that technological developments, such as 
hydraulic fracturing, may have played an important role in this revolution.  
 However, one limitation of this study is that it only examines simple relationships 
between prices over time. The analysis can only determine whether a regime switch has 
occurred, if so when, and what the new equilibrium looks like after it has been reached. It 
offers no explanation as to the causes of a regime change, nor any prediction as to what 
new equilibrium will be reached after the regime switch has occurred. Future research 
should pursue these theoretical concerns to determine the role that hydraulic fracturing 
and other technologies have played in disrupting these markets, or whether decreased 
substitutability played a more significant role (Brown & Yücel, 2008). 
Whatever the cause, a change occurred that caused the initial decoupling of the 
two markets, and it appears that the markets may have since recoupled in a new 
equilibrium. This new equilibrium seems to be characterized by inexpensive natural gas 
relative to oil, and less price volatility for both commodities. The new equilibrium also 
appears to be entering a new state of fragility, which may lead to further changes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LNG IS LINKING REGIONAL NATURAL GAS MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
GRAVITY MODEL1 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The technical problems associated with transporting a pressurized gas have 
historically dictated that natural gas markets be regionally isolated markets, with persistent 
price differences. However, in recent years, the process of  liquefying natural gas to reduce 
transportation costs has become more common and trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
has increased (Ruester, 2010). Research has demonstrated that international natural gas 
market prices are increasingly integrated (Neumann, 2012; Neumann, Siliverstovs, & von 
Hirschhausen, 2006; Siliverstovs, L'Hégaret, Neumann, & von Hirschhausen, 2005); often 
the literature has suggested that liquefied natural gas  may be a major reason for this 
integration (Brown & Yücel, 2009; Neumann, 2012). This explanation seems likely 
because LNG accounts for about 20% of the share of global natural gas trade and that 
share is expected to increase to 30% (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2005). Figure 3.1 shows the 
share of LNG exports over the period of this study. This figure shows that over the past 
nine years the share of LNG trade increased. 
LNG plays a critical role in market integration because of its flexibility in terms of 
delivery. Traditional CNG is transported through pipelines to consumers. The pipelines 
are fixed in direction of flow and physical location of delivery points. The fixed nature of  
                                               
1 This chapter was co-authored with Ryan Bosworth, and published in Energy Economics Volume 
47 Issue 1 pp.11-17. 
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Figure 3-1. Share of LNG exports 
 
 
CNG greatly reduces the number of delivery points and helps to support regional markets 
that are not integrated with the international market. LNG may be delivered to multiple, 
albeit a limited number of points. Furthermore, LNG has been known to be re-routed to 
delivery points other than the original intended destination (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2005).The 
flexibility that LNG provides expands the international delivery of natural gas from a 
pipeline model to one that more closely resembles a traditional commodity. Thus LNG 
may indeed play a direct role in market integration. 
Despite the key role that LNG may play in the integration of these markets, there 
is little direct evidence that increased LNG trade is in fact the cause of increased natural 
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gas market integration. One exception is Neumann (2012), who examines the 
cointegration properties of natural gas prices to determine whether LNG is contributing to 
the integration process of broader natural gas markets. However, this evidence is based 
on price movements rather than direct observation of trade volumes.  
This study directly examines trade volumes to determine the extent to which LNG 
is a regional commodity. The key contribution of the paper is the use of a gravity model to 
determine how regional the international LNG market is and the extent to which LNG has 
affected trade in the total natural gas market. We then compare these results to an 
analogous analysis of trade in the market for compressed natural gas (CNG). 
The main results of this study indicate that while LNG is indeed an international 
commodity, CNG remains a regional commodity; however, the international natural gas 
market is less regional overall due to increased trade in LNG. The results of this study 
may therefore be considered a complement to existing studies of natural gas market 
integration: while existing studies provide evidence of market integration by considering 
price movements, we provide evidence of market integration by considering changes in 
traded quantities of LNG.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature. Section three explains the data. The fourth section develops the model. Section 
five presents and discusses results, and the final section concludes. 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Trade in Natural Gas 
Wang and Notteboom (2011) explore global LNG trade, and find that short term 
trading is increasing globally. Razavi (2009) reports that Asia accounts for 24% of LNG 
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imports, Europe for 24% and North America for about 10%. They also find that to 
accommodate this trade, and to take advantage of economies of scale, firms have 
increased the size of their tankers and receiving terminals. Similarly, Ruester (2010) finds 
that firms that invest in all aspects of the supply chain are better positioned to arbitrage 
regional prices. Engelen and Dullaert (2010) find that LNG markets, along with other 
alternative fuel markets, are becoming more efficient. Furthermore, Aune, Rosendahl, and 
Sagen (2009) suggest that the global natural gas trade will increase substantially in the 
coming decades, mostly from LNG. With this increase in LNG trade Rosendahl and Sagen 
(2009) predict that natural gas prices will rise in Europe. Paltsev et al. (2011) find that a 
globally integrated natural gas market will lead to more U.S. imports. Ghorban (2006) 
notes that countries with large natural gas deposits invest in the ability to export this 
commodity. 
These previous studies provide an intuitive explanation for studies that suggest 
that regional natural gas prices are becoming integrated into one global market.  
Siliverstovs et al. (2005) and Nuemann (2012) both view LNG as a major contributor to 
global price integration. Brown & Yücel (2009), however, find that oil prices may 
intermediate the price in different natural gas markets, while LNG plays a smaller role. 
Furthermore, simply deregulating natural gas markets may have led to increased 
integration of regional markets. For example, following deregulation in the United States, 
Cuddington and Wang (2006) found evidence that the eastern and central markets of the 
United States became integrated, while the west remained a regional market. Europe’s 
natural gas markets became deregulated about a decade after U.S. markets. Neumann 
et al. (2006) and Robinson (2007) both found evidence that national markets in Europe 
became more integrated after deregulation. 
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The principal findings of this paper are most similar to Jensen (2004) who 
concludes that a global market for LNG already exists, but that this market does not 
necessarily imply a global market for natural gas. Jensen analyzed contracts for natural 
gas trade, and noted the increase in short-term LNG contracts between countries were 
evidence of a global market emerging. In contrast, the current study utilizes a gravity 
model to explain the degree to which CNG, LNG, and total natural gas markets are 
regionalized.  
3.2.2. Using Gravity Models to Analyze Trade Flows 
The gravity model has been a popular empirical method for describing bilateral 
trade flows.  See Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis, and Tsamboulas (2010) for a review of the most 
recent studies. Other authors have developed the potential theoretical underpinnings of 
the gravity model (Anderson, 1979, 2010; Bergstrand, 1985). The theoretical basis for the 
gravity model focuses on its role as measuring transportation costs. Moreover, a steady 
advancement of empirical methods has led to better fits for the gravity model (Egger & 
Pfaffermayr, 2003; Martin & Herath, 2008; Mátyás, 1997; Westerlund & Wilhelmsson, 
2011). Although theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model may be unclear in some 
contexts (Deardorff, 1998), the ability to link our dependent variable (trade flows) with 
distance makes it a natural choice for the purposes of this study. We use the gravity model 
to describe trade flows in the natural gas market. This approach is most similar to the use 
of the gravity model to identify regional trading biases. See Greenaway and Milner (2002) 
for a review of this literature. The inclusion of distance as a regressor within the gravity 
model helps to identify differences between sub-markets in the natural gas market. A 
related application of the gravity model is the analysis of the effect of free trade 
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agreements on the level of trade between different countries (Carrere, 2006; Darku, 2009; 
Stack & Pentecost, 2011). 
3.3. Data 
We obtain data on exports from the U.N.’s comtrade database.  This database 
consists of self-reports from countries worldwide on exports and imports of various 
products. A 6 digit harmonized system (HS) of commodity descriptions is used by the 
database. We utilize data from two HS codes, one for CNG (271121) and the other for 
LNG (271111). 
The data is organized into trading pairs where the exporting country reports the 
volume of trade with another country. To account for imports as well as exports, each 
unilateral relationship constitutes a unique pair. For example, if Brazil exports CNG to 
Argentina, this would be considered to be an observation that is distinct from Argentina 
exporting CNG to Brazil. Viewing these relationships as distinct allows the dataset to 
incorporate information on the net exports of each country while using data on total 
exports. 
We use a sample of 92 countries selected by Kellenberg (2012) to be 
representative of the global income distribution. Table 3.2 lists these 92 countries. Each 
country’s exports in CNG and LNG were reported to the U.N. from 1988 to 2011. The 
panel follows a potential of 184 unilateral trading pairs across 23 years. As mentioned 
above each trading pair is considered in two potential observations, one where the first 
country exports to the second country and another where the roles are reversed. A number 
of countries never exported CNG or LNG to one or more of the partner countries in any 
year. Any trading pair that did not trade in any given year was not included in the dataset,  
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Table 3-1. Summary Statistics  
 Mean SD Description 
Distance (km) 7383.23 4354.50 Distance between capital cities 
 
Exporting countries   
GDP 12912.99 16414.95 Gross Domestic Product  per Capita(constant 2005 
USD) 
Landlocked 0.12 0.32 Dummy indicating whether country is landlocked 
Unemployment 
Rate 
8.26 4.29 Unemployment rate in % 
Natural Gas 0.95 2.64 % of GDP that comes from production of Natural 
Gas 
Protected Land 12.42 9.52 % of land mass of country that is protected by 
government 
    
Importing Countries   
GDP 12328.66 16119.44 Gross Domestic Product per Capita(constant 2005 
USD) 
Landlocked 0.13 0.33 Dummy indicating whether country is landlocked 
Unemployment 
Rate 
8.37 4.29 Unemployment rate in % 
Natural Gas 0.85 2.50 % of GDP that comes from production of Natural 
Gas 
Protected Land 12.74 9.53 % of land mass of country that is protected by 
government 
 
 
leaving an unbalanced panel of 147 unilateral trading pairs. Leaving these pairs out is 
equivalent to simply analyzing the existent natural gas market.  
One feature of the data is that the total international trade of LNG has grown over 
the sample period. While CNG still accounts for most of natural gas exports worldwide, 
trade in LNG is increasing. Figure 3.2 shows total trade for both CNG and LNG. Notice 
the consistent growth in LNG exports (Figure 3.3), while CNG shows a considerable 
amount of volatility. 
The U.N. comtrade dataset was merged with data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. This data included information about each country’s income  
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Figure 3-2. Natural gas exports 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Share of natural gas exports 
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Table 3-2. List of Natural Gas Exporting Countries 
 
 
 
Country 
Average 
Distance from 
Trading 
Partners (km) 
Total 
Exports 
(1000 kg) 
LNG 
Exports 
(1000 kg) 
CNG Exports 
(1000 kg) 
Argentina 10154.4 30995.13 0.027 30995.1 
Australia 5329.54 361.13 361.13 0.0017 
Belgium 5462.87 8159.38 452.32 7707.052 
Bolivia 9342.72 115017.4 834.40 114183 
Brazil 8609.89 225.78 225.78 0.00019 
Canada 7290.54 854893.8 0.16 854893.7 
Chile 10517.1 159.00 2.0092 156.99 
China 9774.48 8.99 2.096 6.90 
Colombia 8411.78 945.75 0 945.75 
Czech Republic 5335.85 11.70 0.0023 11.70 
Dominican Republic 7668.5 0.0026 0.0012 0.0015 
Estonia 5722.93 0.00018 0.00018 0 
Finland 5763.04 0.97 0.97 0 
Greece 5583.09 0.0032 0 0.0032 
Hungary 5368.41 0.0056 0 0.0056 
India 8510.91 46.70 45.80 0.91 
Israel 6113.57 0.20 0.020 0.18 
Italy 5350.74 295.14 295.07 0.067 
Jamaica 7971.67 0 0 0 
Japan 10664.3 0.31 0.020 0.29 
Kenya 7811.78 2.87 2.87 0 
South Korea 10224.3 0.025 0.025 0 
Luxembourg 5327.54 0.011 0.0040 0.0067 
Mexico 9141.89 5757.96 55.63 5702.33 
Mali 6448.93 0 0 0 
Malta 5485.8 0.0028 0.0028 0 
Namibia 8597.54 0.0093 0.0093 0 
Nicaragua 8696.09 0 0 0 
Norway 5597.72 135158.7 3058.26 132100.5 
Pakistan 8030.3 0 0 0 
Panama 8458.89 0.00096 0 0.00096 
Peru 9511.5 2756.32 2756.32 0.00081 
Poland 5460.8 5.73 0.01 5.72 
Russia 5960.78 421929 20300.95 401628.1 
El Salvador 5310.5 0 0 0 
Tunisia 5456.04 0 0 0 
Turkey 5841.11 507.78 0.00084 507.78 
Uganda 7586.98 0 0 0 
Ukraine 5670.96 3455.49 0.01 3455.48 
United States 7445.59 111082.1 11875.76 99206.3 
Venezuela 7876.93 0.0078 0.0078 0 
Vietnam 11165.6 4.76 4.75 0.011 
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(GDP), unemployment rates, the percentage of GDP that comes from the production of 
natural gas, the percentage of land area that is protected (i.e. set aside for nature 
preserves, national parks, etc.) within a country for each time period. The calculated 
distances between two countries are based on the latitude and longitude of the capital 
cities.  
Naturally, the further apart two countries are, the more costly transportation of 
goods will be between these two countries. This fact is the main driver behind the results 
of this paper, namely that LNG is easier to transport over long distances than CNG. 
Therefore a measure of distance between two countries is required to carry out the 
empirical modeling. The measure used is the distance between the two capital cities of 
each country2. This distance was calculated based on the great circle distance between 
the two capital cities. 
Traditionally, the gravity model has been estimated with a control for the level of 
income between the two trading partners. The assumption is that the level of trade 
between two countries is positively related to their incomes. A related control variable is 
the unemployment rate. It serves as a control for the general economic conditions within 
the two countries.  
                                               
2 The distance between capital cities is a common measure of distance between two countries in 
the gravity model literature (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006); we follow this practice in the paper. Usually, 
the capital city is one of the largest population centers for the country, and proxies the distance 
between the origin of goods and the final destination better than land mass centroids, or nearest 
border estimates. The correlation coefficient of the distance between the population weighted 
landmass centroids and the distance between capital cities is 0.9986. With this knowledge the 
authors were relatively unsurprised to find virtually identical results to those presented in the main 
text when using population weighted landmass centroids to measure the distance between 
countries. 
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Another important control is some measure of the relative abundance of raw 
natural gas in each country. We use the percentage of the GDP attributable directly to the 
production of natural gas as a proxy for this variable. Even if a country is relatively 
abundant in raw natural gas deposits, those deposits may not be available for extraction 
due to laws and regulations. We control for this fact by also including a variable that 
measures the proportion of the country’s land mass protected in national parks, nature 
preserves, etc. Landlocked countries may experience difficulty trading because of their 
lack of natural ports. We include a dummy variable to control for this effect. 
3.4. Model 
An important econometric consideration is that the key independent variable of 
interest, the distance between the two countries, does not vary over time. This 
consideration restricts the number of available econometric models considerably. For 
example, the fixed effects estimator will not estimate the coefficient for this variable, 
because the distance variable would be differenced out of the model. Therefore, we use 
a panel regression model with random effects. This model will allow us to retain the 
variable of interest while still exploiting the panel nature of the data.  
Furthermore, each variable except for the trend and the distance between the two 
countries is used twice; once for the country from which the export originated, and again 
for the country of destination. In the reported results, we organize these variables under 
the subheadings “export” and ‘import” to indicate to which country the variable refers. 
Because of the 23 year length of the panel, it may also be appropriate to allow for an 
autocorrelated error term. Therefore, an AR (1) process is deployed in the model to correct 
for any possible autocorrelation. The full model is  
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(1-1)   log(𝑇𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 log(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝐗
′𝛃 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝐗 is a matrix of control variables mentioned above, u is an error term with an AR(1) 
process. This model was run on the levels of trade for the full natural gas market, CNG, 
and LNG as the dependent variables respectively. The results of these regressions are 
reported in Table 3.3, and are discussed below. 
As a robustness check, alternative specifications of the model were also estimated.  
In the second specification of the model, the AR (1) process was dropped from the model. 
The results for this specification are in Table 3.4. Another specification uses a pooled OLS 
model with clustered standard errors, clustered on pairs of countries. The results from this 
regression are also included in Table 3.4. We note that the results of these alternative 
specifications are similar to the results in Table 3.3, suggesting that our results are not 
sensitive to choice of error specification. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Main Results 
The results in Table 3.3 show clearly that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the distance between two countries and the level of trade of LNG 
between those countries.  On the other hand there is a strong, and statistically significant, 
relationship between the distance of the two countries and the level of trade in CNG.  
These results indicate that increasing the distance between two countries by a factor of 2 
will decrease trade of CNG between these two countries by a little less than a factor of 9. 
These results indicate that while CNG is a fuel that is traded only regionally, LNG is a fully 
international good.  
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If the international LNG market did not exist, then the international CNG market 
would be identical to the entire international natural gas market. Thus, trade in LNG greatly 
expands the international nature of the overall natural gas market.  
The final regression in Table 3.3 shows that the natural gas market is less regional 
than it otherwise would have been, had LNG trading not occurred. A cross-model test was 
used to check if the coefficients on the distance variable were statistically different in the 
overall natural gas and CNG models. The test statistic used is a t-statistic. This statistic 
relies on the sample variance-covariance matrix of the two estimates. The variances and 
covariances of this matrix were bootstrapped using random subsamples of the full dataset 
and running regressions on these subsamples. The coefficients of these regressions were 
saved for each of these subsamples, and the variance and covariance were calculated for 
each coefficient. 
The test statistic was t=2.399 with 289 degrees of freedom, which implies a p-value 
of 0.0085. This statistic is also significant for other specifications of the model. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis, that the coefficients on distance are the same for both the CNG and 
natural gas markets, is rejected. This key result suggests that the regional markets for 
natural gas are becoming less regional because LNG is starting to link these markets. 
Furthermore, these results indicate trade in LNG has been increasing at an 
average rate of 20% per annum. Figure 1a shows the growth in trade of LNG over the past 
20 years. As can be seen this growth is nearly exponential in nature, suggesting that LNG 
trading has been growing at an exceptional rate, especially for the past few years. This 
growth further suggests that the linkages between regional markets will become stronger 
in the coming years. Surprisingly, national income, of the importer and exporter, is found 
to have little effect on the amount of trading in natural gas that occurs. This result suggests  
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Table 3-3. Panel Regression with AR(1) Process and Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total CNG LNG 
log(Distance) -1.258*** -2.880*** 0.155 
 (0.469) (0.540) (0.494) 
    
Export    
log(GDP) -0.0488 -0.259 0.218 
 (0.331) (0.408) (0.333) 
Landlocked -3.796 -6.518*** -6.014* 
 (2.712) (2.387) (3.340) 
Unemployment % -0.0342 -0.0578 -0.199** 
 (0.0727) (0.101) (0.0810) 
Nat. Gas GDP % 0.119* 0.229*** -0.124 
 (0.0627) (0.0623) (0.115) 
Protected Land % -0.0982 -0.206** 0.0406 
 (0.0678) (0.0915) (0.0691) 
    
Import    
log(GDP) 0.0193 0.122 -0.0350 
 (0.365) (0.456) (0.360) 
Landlocked 4.194** 2.415 -2.760 
 (2.078) (1.962) (2.545) 
Unemployment % 0.0983 0.148* -0.00423 
 (0.0728) (0.0787) (0.107) 
Nat. Gas GDP % -0.149 -0.219 -0.120 
 (0.112) (0.135) (0.131) 
Protected Land % 0.0187 -0.0234 -0.000791 
 (0.0497) (0.0511) (0.0565) 
    
Time Trend 0.00570 -0.0577 0.189** 
 (0.0578) (0.0658) (0.0771) 
Constant 22.44*** 40.12*** 5.924 
 (6.368) (8.076) (6.585) 
Observations 507 290 264 
Number of pairs 
R2 
146 
0.217 
75 
0.412 
104 
0.133 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 3-4. Alternative Specifications 
 Panel Regression with Random 
Effects  
Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total CNG LNG Total CNG LNG 
Logdist -1.035** -2.791*** 0.175 -1.748** -3.241*** 0.114 
 (0.499) (0.624) (0.534) (0.719) (0.854) (0.740) 
Export       
log(GDP) -0.202 -0.409 0.237 0.494 0.283 0.447 
 (0.351) (0.467) (0.355) (0.378) (0.506) (0.418) 
Landlocked -3.124 -5.967** -5.830 -6.719*** -9.698*** -
7.607*** 
 (2.925) (2.823) (3.669) (2.443) (2.607) (2.870) 
Unemployment % 0.0830 0.0314 -0.169** -0.199 -0.287 -
0.365*** 
 (0.067) (0.085) (0.079) (0.136) (0.175) (0.107) 
Nat. Gas GDP % 0.111** 0.185*** -0.159 0.616*** 0.574*** 0.184 
 (0.0530) (0.0492) (0.120) (0.134) (0.121) (0.178) 
Protected Land % -0.0251 -0.0991 0.0540 -0.145 -0.271* 0.145 
 (0.0650) (0.0855) (0.0721) (0.0939) (0.138) (0.120) 
       
Import       
log(GDP) 0.135 0.0561 0.0633 -0.0337 -0.0992 0.0167 
 (0.387) (0.525) (0.383) (0.485) (0.651) (0.454) 
Landlocked 4.183* 2.616 -2.980 2.420* -0.784 -3.640 
 (2.223) (2.332) (2.689) (1.454) (1.253) (2.350) 
Unemployment % 0.180*** 0.195*** -0.0458 0.0841 -0.0419 -0.110 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.109) (0.123) (0.125) (0.156) 
Nat. Gas GDP % -0.185 -0.274* -0.178 -0.212** -0.337** -0.0490 
 (0.116) (0.144) (0.140) (0.0922) (0.142) (0.113) 
Protected Land % 0.0482 -0.0220 0.00388 -0.0216 -0.0294 -0.0533 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.059) (0.0534) (0.0676) (0.0502) 
       
Time Trend -0.0635 -0.0625 0.111* -0.102 -0.153 0.128 
 (0.0438) (0.0517) (0.0602) (0.0869) (0.114) (0.112) 
Constant 19.37*** 39.20*** 5.910 26.57*** 46.64*** 5.998 
 (6.668) (8.851) (7.035) (9.507) (13.92) (9.635) 
Observations 507 290 264 507 290 264 
Number of pairs 
R2 
146 
0.170 
75 
0.360 
104 
0.120 
146 
0.307 
75 
0.514 
104 
0.189 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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that natural gas deposits are distributed fairly randomly across spatial dimensions, and is 
neither a primary determinant of income nor is income dependent on natural gas. 
The coefficients estimated on ancillary control variables are all plausible. 
Landlocked countries export less and import more natural gas than their counterparts. 
Likewise when the unemployment rate is high, CNG exports fall and imports rise. Natural 
gas exports increase and imports decrease as the proportion of the county’s GDP 
attributable to natural gas increases. The percentage of a country’s land mass that is 
protected has a negative impact on CNG exports, which may be due to the inability to 
construct pipelines through protected regions.  
3.5.2. Robustness of Results 
The trade flow variables may be non-stationary. We estimate two cross-sectional 
models (pre- and post-recession) to verify the robustness of our results. Since Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PMML) estimators are most appropriate for estimating 
cross-sectional gravity models (Silva & Tenreyo, 2006), we employ this specification. This 
estimator has the additional benefit of performing well in the presence of large proportions 
of zero trade flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyo 2010). We take advantage of this benefit 
and reincorporate zero values back into the dataset. The results of this regression are 
shown in table 3.5. The cost of using this specification is that the estimates cannot be 
interpreted in the same way as our previous estimates. This specification requires the use 
of a log-linear form of the gravity model (where coefficients indicate a percentage change) 
instead of a log-log specification (where coefficients are interpreted as elasticities) and is 
therefore not directly comparable. A negative and significant coefficient on the distance 
variable would indicate that the further two countries are apart the less they will trade. The 
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parameter estimates in this specification are significant as expected, namely distance is 
significant and negative in the CNG and NG markets, but not in the LNG market for both 
periods. The positive sign on LNG in the second period is somewhat surprising, as it 
indicates that the further two countries are from each other the more trade they will engage 
in. This counterintuitive result could be explained by the post-recession regression being 
performed on data gathered during the recovery from the recession. 
Temperature is an important driver in the natural gas market, and prices are 
conditioned on weather (Brown & Yücel, 2008). We control for temperature in the 
importing country using an annual average temperature for that country in a particular 
year. This data was also collected from the World Bank, but is only available until 2009 as 
of the time of writing. We did not include this variable in the main results to take advantage 
of two additional years of data.  Table 3.6 presents the same regressions as Table 3.3, 
except that we include this temperature variable for the importing country. The 
temperatures variables are not significant in any of the regressions and do not materially 
affect the other coefficients.  
The insignificant result in this regression may be caused by the fact that natural gas 
may be used both for heating by direct combustion and cooling through electricity 
generation. Future research may be able to disentangle the effect of extreme temperature 
variation on patterns of international trade of natural gas. 
Oil prices may also be considered an important determinant of the trade of LNG 
(Brown & Yucel, 2008). We have estimated models that include oil prices as an 
explanatory variable; however, oil prices were not readily available for every region 
considered for some time periods. This restriction substantially reduces the number of 
observations available for analysis (only 52 observations for both the CNG and LNG  
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Table 3-5. Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimators 
 2007  2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total CNG LNG Total CNG LNG 
Logdist -1.960*** -1.991*** -0.584 -1.319*** -2.205*** 1.398** 
 (0.385) (0.407) (1.330) (0.421) (0.567) (0.605) 
Export       
log(GDP) 6.135 6.286 24.46** 3.795*** 12.53 1.302* 
 (4.838) (5.060) (11.57) (1.385) (10.68) (0.699) 
Landlocked -11.09** -11.32** -26.02*** -7.789*** -5.952***  
 (4.893) (5.128) (8.636) (1.279) (1.802)  
Unemployment % 0.690 0.713 -3.148* 0.764*** 2.107 0.597*** 
 (0.921) (0.979) (1.756) (0.222) (2.515) (0.202) 
Nat. Gas GDP % 1.573 1.613 -3.784* 1.799*** 3.805 2.125*** 
 (1.254) (1.304) (2.137) (0.355) (4.497) (0.341) 
Protected Land % -0.995* -1.018* -0.798** -0.540*** -1.435 -0.197*** 
 (0.603) (0.617) (0.398) (0.181) (1.105) (0.0643) 
Import       
log(GDP) 1.320*** 1.309*** 1.560 1.752 1.139 2.442*** 
 (0.467) (0.445) (1.267) (1.292) (1.254) (0.559) 
Landlocked -2.792** -2.728*  -2.843 -1.757  
 (1.406) (1.395)  (2.259) (2.001)  
Unemployment % -0.237 -0.223 -1.168*** -0.150 -0.316 -0.527** 
 (0.266) (0.263) (0.291) (0.136) (0.263) (0.217) 
Nat. Gas GDP % -0.229 -0.212 -0.955* -2.204** -2.259** -10.68*** 
 (0.269) (0.263) (0.499) (0.941) (0.895) (3.923) 
Protected Land % -0.00188 -0.00146 0.0892 -0.0811 -0.110 -0.0113 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.0673) (0.102) (0.113) (0.0404) 
Constant -39.70 -41.09 -224.8** -26.94 -107.8 -34.63** 
 (52.41) (55.02) (108.8) (18.92) (111.9) (16.18) 
Observations 1,223 1,223 1,124 575 575 440 
R2 0.903 0.905 0.797 0.375 0.867 0.938 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
 
models). This restriction does not appear to be important to the analysis; we find that the 
results of regressions that include oil prices are not substantially different from the results 
of the regressions excluding oil prices. We therefore report only the results of models 
without oil prices.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
This paper has estimated the relationship between trade volumes and distance 
between countries in the CNG, LNG, and overall natural gas markets via the gravity model. 
The results from this analysis offer a confirmation that the recent rise in LNG exports is 
indeed the major contributing factor to the increasing integration of global natural gas 
markets.  
The use of the gravity model to explore this observed market integration is a novel 
approach. Much of the work done in this area has focused on tests for mean reversion 
between two or more prices. The different approach taken in this paper offers strong 
confirming and complementary evidence that LNG is responsible for de-regionalizing the 
total natural gas market. 
The findings presented in this paper suggest that the LNG trade has made the world 
market in natural gas less sensitive to distance between trading partners and that trade 
flows are less restricted by transportation costs than they would have been otherwise. 
These results suggest that the flexibility to deliver LNG to multiple points plays a crucial 
role in developing a global market for natural gas. 
The main limitation of this approach is that it cannot identify whether or not natural 
gas prices are statistically integrated, and the strength of that integration. On the other 
hand, mean reversion tests on observed price data are capable of identifying whether or 
not markets are becoming more integrated, and the extent of that integration. Another 
limitation of this study is that the gravity model considers volume of trade, rather than the 
price at which trade occurs and does not account for the complex pricing clauses in natural 
gas contracts. This evidence is therefore best viewed as complementary to the findings of 
studies that use mean reversions techniques to indicate increasing price integration of  
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Table 3-6. Panel Regression with Temperature Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total CNG LNG 
log(Distance) -1.321*** -2.871*** 0.129 
 (0.469) (0.534) (0.504) 
    
Export    
log(GDP) -0.163 -0.214 0.112 
 (0.330) (0.400) (0.334) 
Landlocked -4.719 -8.059*** -4.961 
 (2.999) (2.588) (3.327) 
Unemployment % -0.0465 -0.0727 -0.197** 
 (0.0733) (0.102) (0.0815) 
Nat. Gas GDP % 0.136* 0.239*** -0.0695 
 (0.0631) (0.0628) (0.119) 
Protected Land % -0.104 -0.220** 0.0295 
 (0.119) (0.0907) (0.0694) 
    
Import    
log(GDP) -0.0178 -0.0658 0.0321 
 (0.365) (0.498) (0.440) 
Landlocked 4.356** 2.247 -1.934 
 (2.049) (1.911) (2.525) 
Unemployment % 0.0977 0.139* -0.0417 
 (0.0733) (0.0798) (0.110) 
Nat. Gas GDP % -0.141 -0.256 -0.0501 
 (0.118) (0.140) (0.141) 
Protected Land % 0.0551 -0.00976 0.0438 
 (0.0523) (0.0536) (0.0601) 
Temperature -0.0178 -0.0544 0.0446 
 (0.0654) (0.0764) (0.0682) 
    
    
Time Trend -0.0553 -0.0451 0.0571 
 (0.0603) (0.0701) (0.0813) 
Constant 25.92*** 42.09*** 7.173 
 (6.710) (8.110) (7.046) 
Observations 475 278 240 
Number of pairs 
R2 
140 
0.243 
74 
0.432 
98 
0.0986 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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natural gas markets (Neumann, 2009).  Our findings, considered together with evidence 
provided by studies of the level of integration in prices, provide suggestive evidence that 
LNG has afforded the global market additional opportunities to engage in price arbitrage 
of natural gas (Wang & Notteboom, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNDER WHAT PRICE CONDITIONS DO CNG-POWERED PASSENGER VEHICLES 
MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE?3 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Natural gas has the potential to be an attractive substitute for petroleum in the 
market for automotive fuel. New drilling and recovery techniques have resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the amount of recoverable natural gas consequently creating a 
decrease in domestic natural gas prices (Paltsev et al., 2011). Natural gas prices in the 
U.S. have fallen more than sixty percent from their peak in 2008 and proven reserves are 
approaching all time high levels (Moniz, 2011; Paltsev et al., 2011; Staub, 2013). The 
increasing price for petroleum and decreasing price for natural gas, at British Thermal Unit 
(BTU) parity quantities, means there is a growing cost advantage for natural gas. Natural 
gas also has the desirable property of emitting fewer greenhouse gases, which could 
increase progress toward climate change goals, as well as less particulate matter. Figure 
4.1 shows the divergence in wholesale spot market prices for natural gas and oil between 
1994-2012. Figure 4.2 shows an analogous divergence for retail Compressed Natural Gas 
(CNG) prices compared to gasoline and diesel fuel. 
Research suggests that the cost advantage for natural gas may continue in the United 
States for many years. In part, natural gas markets, unlike the world oil market, lack strong 
integration and regional price differences can persist for longer periods of time. (Bachmeier & 
Griffin, 2006; Siliverstovs, L'Hégaret, Neumann, & von Hirschhausen, 2005).  Additionally,  
                                               
3 This chapter was co-authored with Ryan Bosworth, Kevin Heaslip, and Ali Soltani-Sobh 
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Figure 4-1. Energy prices 
Source: U.S. EIA 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Fuel prices 
Source: U.S. EIA 
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Paltsev et al. (2011) find that the supply of natural gas in the United States is projected to 
grow substantially between now and 2050, with a possible “low-end” estimate suggesting 
supply growth only through 2030. Summarizing their results, these authors find that “the 
outlook for gas over the next several decades is highly favorable” and that “[natural gas] 
resource supply is adequate to meet growing demand at moderate prices through 2050” 
(p. 1).  
 Although the low per-BTU cost and reduced pollution associated with natural gas 
are appealing properties, there are several economic and technical factors preventing 
widespread adoption of CNG-powered vehicles. CNG vehicles are more expensive than 
gasoline-powered vehicles, partly due of the cost of building fuel systems capable of 
handling a compressed gaseous fuel.  These added expenses have contributed to a low 
supply of CNG vehicles. Low vehicle supply has, in turn, contributed to a limited fueling 
infrastructure. The engineering requirements within a vehicles for CNG fuel tanks result 
in: reduced vehicle range, increased fueling frequency, increased vehicle weight due to 
heavy fuel tanks capable of safely storing a compressed fuel, and reduced storage space. 
Additionally, CNG vehicles are typically less powerful due to the lower energy density of 
natural gas compared to gasoline vehicles (Werpy et al., 2010; Whyatt, 2010). For 
example, the 2012 Honda Civic CNG is rated at 110 hp and 106 lb-ft of torque and weighs 
2848 pounds. All gasoline powered Civic models are rated at 140 hp and 128 lb-ft of torque 
and weigh about 2600 pounds. However, both types of vehicle are rated at 31 MPG 
(combined city/highway).  
A vital component of this study is a consumer decision-making model which 
considers the annual VMT for the vehicle, the premium paid for the CNG fueled vehicle, 
the fuel efficiency of the vehicle being replaced, and the price differential between CNG 
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and petroleum gas. This model strives to predict, using various price conditions, what 
share of the vehicle fleet would find a CNG vehicle more financially worthwhile than an 
equivalent petroleum vehicle.  Analysis is conducted given the assumption of a CNG 
fueling infrastructure being fully developed and CNG vehicles were widely available for 
purchase, with the current fuel and vehicle prices. The paper presents a synopsis of the 
current state of the CNG and NGV markets, the development of the consumer choice 
model, and analysis of the results of the model for future adoption of CNG vehicle 
technology, and finishes with summary and conclusions. 
4.2. Current State of the Market 
According to the Natural Gas Vehicle Association of America there are currently 
approximately 120,000 natural gas vehicles (NGV) in the U.S. fleet and 15.2 million NGVs 
worldwide. The Department of Energy reports that there are currently 519 public 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) stations in the United States and a total of 1,107 stations 
when private stations are included. The U.S. lags many countries in the use of natural gas 
vehicles, as shown in Table 4.1, ranking 17th in NGV fleet size. 
There are few CNG passenger vehicles on the market in the United States. This 
paucity of choice suggests considerable uncertainty regarding the price premium for a 
CNG vehicle. Honda’s Civic CNG is the only consumer ready vehicle, although some 
vehicles are available for fleets and special orders. The limited information available 
suggests that the CNG price premium has not decreased over time and that higher volume 
manufacturing may not lower costs significantly.  For example, Walls (1996) estimates 
(inflation-adjusted) incremental CNG vehicle costs of less than $5000.   Depending on  
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Table 4-1. Top 10 Countries for NGV Deployment and U.S. Ranking 
Country Number of Vehicles 
% of Total NGVs 
Worldwide 
Iran 2,859,386 18.82% 
Pakistan 2,850,500 18.76% 
Argentina 1,900,000 12.50% 
Brazil 1,694,278 11.15% 
India 1,100,000 7.24% 
China 1,000,000 6.58% 
Italy 779,090 5.13% 
Ukraine 390,000 2.57% 
Columbia 348,747 2.30% 
Thailand 300,581 1.98% 
United States (17th) ~120,000 > 1% 
Adapted from NGV America (2012) (www.ngvc.org) 
 
 
options, a Honda Civic GX costs about $4000-$7,000 more than its gasoline counterpart 
(Werpy et al., 2010).  
Although this paper focuses on the economic viability of CNG for passenger 
vehicles, similar limitations exist for CNG-powered heavy-duty trucks. Despite the 
potentially large fuel-cost savings for large trucks, widespread adoption of heavy-duty 
CNG vehicles has not yet occurred. As noted by Deal (2012), some factors limiting the 
application of CNG in heavy-duty vehicles include:  
 Limited refueling infrastructure (compared to diesel)  
 natural gas trucks are substantially more expensive 
 high-capital costs associated with upgrading a maintenance shop to deal with CNG 
vehicles limited capacity of economical CNG fuel tanks limits operational range 
and adds weight to the truck,  
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 LNG (liquid natural gas) use is limited to situations where trucks are re-fueled every 
1-2 days 
 some fleets are apprehensive about adopting new “high risk” technology 
 
As with passenger vehicles, a major constraint to the widespread adoption of CNG 
vehicles for heavy-duty use is the limited availability of vehicles or more specifically, 
suitable engines. Limited availability is due in part to technical limitations associated with 
CNG. A major consideration is that heavy duty trucks have large power requirements. As 
explained by Deal (2012) “spark-ignited natural gas engines are not able to achieve the 
high compression ratio or horsepower of a diesel engine because of the need to prevent 
pre-ignition and engine damage”. This problem results in a requirement for a larger 
displacement engine to provide the necessary power. This results in a fuel efficiency 
penalty of about 10% (Deal, 2012).   
The price premium for heavy-duty trucks varies substantially with the size of the 
vehicle. For example, GM heavy-duty pickups (Chevrolet Silverado 2500 HD) with a bi-
fuel option (can run on CNG or gasoline) cost about $11,000 extra (Bowman, 2012). 
However, larger trucks carry a substantially larger price premium. Deal (2012) reports that 
natural gas trucks with the ISLG 8.9L spark-ignited gas engine cost $30,000 to $40,000 
more than comparable diesel engines. Trucks with the larger ISX-G 15L engine cost about 
$70,000 more. CNG operating costs are also increased due to the greater weight, more 
frequent refueling, and reduced range of the vehicles. Finally, the benefits of CNG depend 
on reduced fuel costs, therefore, price fluctuations of CNG unexpectedly influenced by 
market forces or governmental policy changes cause CNG to be viewed as a risk. 
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4.3. Modeling Procedures 
The model established for this research has been developed from the perspective 
of a consumer and the results are specific to the passenger vehicle fleet in the United 
States. The financial decision of a consumer to adopt a CNG vehicle is similar to the 
decision a business would make when looking to purchase a vehicle. For additional 
information on CNG for heavy vehicles, see Deal (2012) and Whyatt (2010), which 
investigate the cost-effectiveness of Heavy-Duty CNG trucks.  
In order to model CNG vehicle adoption as a financial decision, it is necessary to 
make several simplifying assumptions. Assumptions specific to our model are discussed 
in detail below, however, the most important assumption underlying this analysis is that a 
CNG vehicle is actually an available option for consumers. Currently, CNG fueling 
infrastructure is extremely limited in many areas of the United States. This lack of 
infrastructure renders CNG impracticable for many, if not most, consumers. Moreover, 
CNG vehicle choices are extremely limited. Consumers in general may not be able to 
choose a CNG vehicle that fits their needs even if such a vehicle would be cost effective 
because it is not available. With this assumption in mind, it is noted that the predictions of 
our model represent what is possible with expanded CNG infrastructure and expanded 
CNG vehicle selection, rather than what is probable under current conditions.  
This analysis is based on current technological possibilities. Given current 
technology and prices, CNG adoption represents a cost-effective decision for some 
consumers, simply because CNG vehicles enjoy a fuel cost advantage over similar 
gasoline-powered vehicles. This cost advantage may be undermined by new 
technological developments in conventional petroleum fueled or other alternatively fueled 
vehicles. 
56 
 
4.3.1. A Model of Consumer Demand for CNG Passenger Vehicles 
 The model considers an individual choosing between two vehicles that differ only 
in initial purchase price and fuel system.  If the vehicles are otherwise identical and the 
individual does not have a fuel system preference, the choice can be characterized as a 
purely financial cost-minimization decision. Basic financial economic theory suggests that 
the individual will choose the vehicle with the lowest cost, where cost is measured by the 
net present discounted value of all cash flows associated with the choice. The only 
relevant costs are the initial purchase price, depreciation costs, and the cost of fuel, 
otherwise the vehicles are assumed identical. Basic maintenance costs, registration fees, 
and other costs associated with normal vehicle ownership are assumed to be the same 
across vehicles therefore are irrelevant to the model. Discussions of the implications of 
these simplifying assumptions are below. With these assumptions, however, the total cost 
associated with the gasoline-powered vehicle can be expressed as: 
(4-1) 𝑇𝐶𝑔 = 𝑉𝑔0 + 𝑓𝑔0 + 𝑓𝑔1(1 + 𝑟)
−1 + ⋯ + 𝑓𝑔𝑇(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑇 − 𝑉𝑔0(1 + 𝛿)
−𝑇(1 + 𝑟)−𝑇 , 
where 𝑇𝐶𝑔 is the total present discounted value of all costs associated with the gasoline-
powered vehicle, 𝑉𝑔0 is the value or purchase price of the gasoline vehicle in the initial 
time period, 𝑓𝑔𝑡 is fuel costs in period 𝑡, and 𝑟 represents the individual’s rate of discount. 
𝑇 is the terminal period at which point the individual sells or scraps the vehicle. The 
parameter 𝛿  measures the per-period rate of depreciation and the last term in the 
expression therefore captures the sales or scrap value of the vehicle at time 𝑇. If it is 
assumed that fuel costs are the same in each period, such that 𝑓𝑔𝑡 = 𝑓𝑔 for all 𝑡, this 
expression can be simplified and written as: 
(4-2)  𝑇𝐶𝑔 = [𝑉𝑔0 + −𝑉𝑔0{(1 + 𝛿)(1 + 𝑟)}
−𝑇] + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 𝑓𝑔 
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Note that the expression [𝑉𝑔0 + −𝑉𝑔0{(1 + 𝛿)(1 + 𝑟)}
−𝑇] is the vehicle purchase 
cost less the present discounted value of the terminal value (scrap or resale value) of the 
vehicle. This term therefore represents the cost to the consumer of owning the vehicle for 
𝑇 periods independent of fuel costs. Let 𝑉𝑔0
∗  represent this expression and rewrite the 
above equation as: 
(4-3)  𝑇𝐶𝑔 = 𝑉𝑔0
∗ + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 𝑓𝑔. 
Apply the same framework to the CNG vehicle by simply replacing the g subscripts 
with c subscripts. Since the gasoline and CNG vehicles are assumed otherwise identical, 
the consumer’s choice will then be driven by the difference in total costs between the two 
vehicles. The individual will choose the CNG powered vehicle if ∆𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶𝑔 − 𝑇𝐶𝑐 > 0: 
(4-4)  ∆𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝐶𝑔 − 𝑇𝐶𝑐 = (𝑉𝑔0
∗ − 𝑉𝑐0
∗ ) + (∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 𝑓𝑔 − ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝑓𝑐). 
This can be written more simply as: 
(4-5)  ∆𝑇𝐶 = (𝑉𝑔0
∗ − 𝑉𝑐0
∗ ) + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 (𝑓𝑔 − 𝑓𝑐). 
An alternative way of thinking about the above choice is to consider the alternative 
fuel system as an investment that pays a yearly rate of return (in the form of lower fuel 
costs) until time 𝑇T. The individual requires that the investment pays a high enough rate 
of return to cover the reservation rate, represented by the discount rate. Using the 
framework above, the initial investment can be thought of as the difference in initial 
purchase price (the extra amount paid for the alternative fuel vehicle) and the dividend as 
the per-period fuel savings. 
4.3.2. Other Model Assumptions  
An important consideration is the effect that various simplifying assumptions implicit 
or explicit in this model may have on consumer vehicle adoption decisions. This model 
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has been developed under the assumption of consumer cost minimization. However, it is 
important to recognize that consumer behavior may be influenced by a number of other 
factors, not all of which are directly consistent with cost minimization.  
 For example, the model assumes that after choosing a fuel system, the consumer’s 
nominal yearly fuel cost is the same in each period. However, fuel prices may fluctuate 
and consumer fuel usage may also vary due to variation in yearly miles driven. While this 
assumption is necessary to develop a tractable model, the actual effect of violation of this 
assumption on predicted CNG adoption rates will depend on many factors such as 
consumer expectations regarding future fuel prices.  
The assumption has also been made that both types of vehicles depreciate at the 
same rate. This assumption may not be true in practice. For passenger vehicles, it is 
assumed that miles per gallon will be the same for both CNG and gasoline powered 
vehicles. While this assumption may be approximately accurate for passenger vehicles, it 
may not be for all vehicles. For example, both the CNG-powered Honda Civic and its 
gasoline-powered counterpart are EPA-rated at 31 MPG. However, heavy-duty trucks 
powered by CNG typically have lower MPG figures than comparable diesel powered 
trucks. See Deal (2012) for more information on mileage for CNG powered heavy-duty 
trucks.  
4.4. Using the Model to Predict Demand for CNG Passenger Vehicles 
In order to predict vehicle fuel system choice for a given consumer, the model 
requires estimates of 𝑉𝑔0, 𝑉𝑐0, 𝑓𝑔, 𝑓𝑐, 𝑇, 𝑟, and 𝛿. Estimates of the distribution of some of 
these variables in the population are available from the National Household Travel Survey 
(NHTS). This data is used to calculate estimated travel cost savings (for the current vehicle 
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fleet) that would result from a switch to a CNG vehicle. Calculating these cost savings 
requires knowledge of both miles per gallon (MPG) and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for 
a given vehicle and that these variables are available from the NHTS.  
Suppose that an equivalent CNG powered vehicle for a given price could replace 
any gasoline-powered vehicle. This replacement could occur either by paying to convert 
or retrofit the vehicle to run on CNG or by selling the vehicle and replacing it with a CNG-
powered equivalent vehicle. This additional cost is the difference between 0gV  and 0cV  in 
the model. This quantity is referred to as the CNG vehicle price differential. If a consumer 
knows the vehicle price differential as well as fuel prices, expected VMT, expected MPG, 
expected time of ownership, the appropriate discount rate and vehicle depreciation rate, 
it is straightforward to calculate the present discounted value of the decision to switch to 
CNG. 
Using these estimates of the present discounted value of the switch to CNG for 
each vehicle in the (sample) fleet, the model simulates the proportion of the population 
that would find this switch advantageous under a set of estimated baseline parameter 
values. Next, it assesses the sensitivity of this simulated proportion to changes in market 
conditions, particularly the vehicle price differential and the fuel price differential (the 
difference between the gallon-equivalent price of CNG and the price of gasoline).  
It should be noted that the simulation estimates shown below are derived under 
assumptions of consumer travel cost minimization (as discussed above) and, importantly, 
under the assumption that vehicle supply and infrastructure are generally available.  
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4.4.1. CNG Passenger Vehicle Price Differential 
Some customers may find the loss in power and increased weight of CNG vehicles 
less desirable to drive therefore this should be factored in the calculation of the appropriate 
vehicle price differential.  Lack of fueling stations and smaller fuel tank capacity will result 
in more frequent, less convenient fill-ups. Consumer loss in utility due to these factors is 
approximately $1100-$3200 in 1996 dollar terms according to Walls (1996). This loss in 
utility due to the inherent disadvantages of CNG vehicles is an imperative component of 
the vehicle price differential.  These disadvantages may not be relevant for some 
consumers but they may be major limitations for others. Conversely, these disadvantages 
may be much less relevant for industrial, service, or fleet vehicles that have access to 
convenient on-site refueling stations, suggesting that CNG adoption may be much more 
likely for these sectors of the transportation economy (Whyatt, 2010). 
4.4.2. Baseline Model Parameters 
In order to simulate the proportion of the passenger vehicle fleet that would find it 
advantageous to switch to CNG vehicles, it is necessary to choose baseline estimates of 
the value of the parameters of the model. These estimates are based on various sources 
and the results based on these estimates are subjected to sensitivity analysis for each 
parameter. These simulations are based on the joint distribution of household VMT and 
MPG in the NHTS (2009).  
This baseline model uses a fuel price differential of $1.50, based on a rough 
estimate of the national gasoline-CNG price differential in the United States in April 2013. 
A vehicle price differential of $7000 was used. This differential is based on the difference 
between a Honda Civic CNG and a Honda Civic EX plus a $3000 “inconvenience 
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premium” based on an inflation adjustment to the estimate of consumer welfare loss by 
Walls (1996, p. 8). A baseline depreciation rate of 15% (Feng et al. 2013), a baseline 
discount rate of 6%, and a baseline estimate of expected length of vehicle ownership of 
60 months, indicated by Kelly Blue Book to be the current average was also used. These 
estimates are based on the sources indicated and market prices observed by the 
researchers. These baseline model parameters are summarized in below.  
Purchase Price Differential - $7000 
Fuel Price Differential - $1.50 
Length of Ownership - 60 Months 
Discount Rate - 6% 
Depreciation Rate - 15% 
 
Table 4.2 below shows how the present discounted value of expected fuel savings 
varies with VMT and MPG under these baseline parameters. The most obvious feature of 
the table is that the fuel savings are much larger for high VMT vehicle and low MPG 
vehicles. This result is intuitive: more miles traveled means more fuel burned therefore 
higher potential savings. Lower MPG likewise suggests high fuel consumption and greater 
potential savings. This result suggests that high mileage, low MPG vehicles are the most 
likely to adopt CNG. This prediction is confirmed by market experience: CNG adoption is 
more likely for high mileage, low MPG vehicles like buses and fleet vehicles.  
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Table 4-2. PDV of Expected Fuel Savings at $1.50 Fuel Price Differential 
MPG 
VMT per year 
8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000 
14 $3,695  $4,618  $5,542  $6,466  $7,389  $8,313  $9,237  $10,160  
16 $3,233  $4,041  $4,849  $5,657  $6,466  $7,274  $8,082  $8,890  
18 $2,874  $3,592  $4,310  $5,029  $5,747  $6,466  $7,184  $7,903  
20 $2,586  $3,233  $3,879  $4,526  $5,173  $5,819  $6,466  $7,112  
22 $2,351  $2,939  $3,527  $4,115  $4,702  $5,290  $5,878  $6,466  
24 $2,155  $2,694  $3,233  $3,772  $4,310  $4,849  $5,388  $5,927  
26 $1,989  $2,487  $2,984  $3,482  $3,979  $4,476  $4,974  $5,471  
28 $1,847  $2,309  $2,771  $3,233  $3,695  $4,157  $4,618  $5,080  
30 $1,724  $2,155  $2,586  $3,017  $3,448  $3,879  $4,310  $4,742  
32 $1,616  $2,021  $2,425  $2,829  $3,233  $3,637  $4,041  $4,445  
34 $1,521  $1,902  $2,282  $2,662  $3,043  $3,423  $3,803  $4,184  
36 $1,437  $1,796  $2,155  $2,514  $2,874  $3,233  $3,592  $3,951  
38 $1,361  $1,701  $2,042  $2,382  $2,722  $3,063  $3,403  $3,743  
40 $1,293  $1,616  $1,940  $2,263  $2,586  $2,910  $3,233  $3,556  
 
 
4.4.3. Simulation Results 
Using the joint distribution of vehicle MPG and VMT from the NHTS of 2009 and 
calculating the proportion of consumers that would find a switch to CNG financially 
advantageous using these baseline model parameters, Table 4.3 shows variation in this 
predicted proportion with respect to the fuel price differential and the vehicle price 
differential for the United States. 
Table 4.3 shows the proportion of the passenger vehicle fleet that would find CNG 
adoption financially advantageous over a range of vehicle price premiums and fuel price 
differentials for the U.S. These baseline estimates of a $7000 vehicle price premium and 
a $1.50 fuel price differential are shown in bold. Variation in predicted adoption rates for a 
range of prices that may be viewed as plausible given current market conditions is also 
shown. Although the fuel price differential is about $1.50 at the time of this writing, a gap  
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Table 4-3. Proportion of Passenger Vehicle Fleet with Positive PDV for CNG 
Adoption (United States) 
  Purchase Price Differential 
G
a
s
 P
ri
c
e
 D
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
l 
  $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 $8,000 $9,000 $10,000 
$1.20 10.0% 1.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.30 14.4% 2.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.40 19.0% 4.7% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.50 22.3% 7.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.60 26.4% 10.0% 2.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.70 30.1% 13.0% 3.8% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.80 34.2% 16.6% 5.7% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
$1.90 37.8% 19.0% 7.8% 2.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
$2.00 40.7% 22.3% 10.0% 3.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
$2.10 45.1% 25.2% 12.5% 4.7% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
$2.20 47.6% 28.7% 14.7% 6.3% 2.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 
$2.30 50.1% 31.2% 16.8% 8.4% 2.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 
$2.40 52.6% 34.2% 19.5% 10.0% 4.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 
$2.50 54.9% 36.7% 22.3% 12.1% 5.6% 1.5% 0.3% 0.2% 
*Model assumes CNG fueling infrastructure and vehicle availability 
 
 
as large as $2.20 occurred as recently as November 2012. At a fuel price differential of 
$1.50 and a vehicle price differential of $7,000, this model predicts that only about 0.1% 
of the vehicle fleet in the United States would find CNG financially beneficial if CNG 
vehicles and fueling infrastructure were widely available.  This small fraction of the 
population suggests that, at current prices, CNG vehicles would not be financially 
beneficial to most consumers, regardless if fueling stations were ubiquitous. However, the 
table also indicates that there is substantial potential for more widespread CNG adoption 
if vehicle price premiums drop and fuel price differentials increase. 
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4.4.4. The Relative Importance of Fuel and Vehicle Price Differentials 
A crucial feature of Table 4.3 is that it shows the relative importance of fuel price 
differential changes and vehicle price differential changes on the proportion of the vehicle 
fleet that would find a switch to CNG advantageous. Note that at the baseline estimate of 
$7,000 for the vehicle price differential, no more than 5.6% of United States vehicles would 
find a switch to CNG advantageous even at the very large CNG price differential of $2.50. 
However, technological improvements resulting in a reduction in the vehicle price premium 
from $7,000 to $4,000 would boost the predicted CNG adoption rate to 7.2% at current 
fuel prices. Extremely high fuel price differentials would not be enough to induce high 
adoption rates while the vehicle price differential is as high as or higher than current 
estimates (around $7,000). However, if the vehicle price differential drops below $4,000, 
relatively large portions of the population may find CNG cost effective despite current fuel 
price differentials. At current vehicle price differentials, however, widespread CNG 
adoption is unlikely even if infrastructure expands and vehicles become available. For 
example, at a vehicle price differential of about $7000, the fuel price differential necessary 
for the model to predict a 50% CNG adoption rate is over $5. A fuel price differential of 
even $2.50 surpasses what has been seen historically; therefore, a fuel price differential 
of $5 may be viewed as an extremely unlikely event. 
It is noteworthy, however, that if the "inconvenience cost" of owning a CNG vehicle 
(8) is not considered, then it is realistic to obtain a price differential of $3000-$4000.These 
costs are likely less important for fleet and service vehicles consequently the model 
suggests that adoption is more likely within these sectors.  
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4.4.5. Other Model Parameters: Sensitivity Analysis 
The authors have also investigated how sensitive the simulation results are to 
variation in the other baseline parameters: ownership time, discount rate, and depreciation 
rate. This has been accomplished by varying each attribute, holding all other attributes 
constant at the baseline. Full results from these sensitivity analyses are omitted because 
of space limitations. As expected, longer vehicle ownership times are associated with 
higher predicted rates of CNG adoption, as are lower discount rates and lower 
depreciation rates.  Nevertheless, this model predicts that only modest changes in 
adoption rates will occur even with relatively large changes in these variables. 
4.5. Looking Forward 
The model of predicted CNG adoption rates is based on the joint distribution of 
VMT and MPG in the vehicle fleet as reported in the 2009 NHTS. As market conditions 
change, consumers can be expected to respond to these changes by altering the number 
of miles driven and by changing vehicle choices. As shown above, an increase in the fuel 
price differential between gasoline and CNG increases the incentive for consumers to 
switch to CNG, ceteris paribus. Increasing gasoline prices directly affects the fuel price 
differential, which is expected to alter the distribution of vehicle miles traveled, and the 
vehicle fleet composition as consumers react to these changes.  
Research suggests that consumers do indeed reduce miles traveled in response 
to gasoline price changes. However, VMT response to changes in gasoline prices (i.e. the 
“rebound effect”) appears to be relatively small and declining over time. (Gillingham, 2011; 
Greene, 1992; Greene, Kahn, & Gibson, 1999; Jones, 1993; Small & Van Dender, 2007). 
Changes in fleet fuel economy in response to higher gasoline prices may be a relatively 
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more important factor than VMT changes for CNG vehicle adoption rates. For example, 
Small and Van Dender (2007) find the long-run rebound effect to be only 2.2% for the time 
period 1997-2001. Interestingly, Burger & Kaffine (2009) find that Los Angeles freeway 
speeds do not decline in response to higher fuel prices, suggesting that fuel prices are not 
a large consideration for most drivers. There is also evidence that vehicle scrappage 
decisions are influenced by gasoline prices. For example, Li, Timmins, and von Haefen 
(2009) show that a 10% increase in gasoline prices is associated with a 0.22% increase 
in fleet fuel economy in the short run and a 2.04% increase in the long run.  
Given that consumers can be predicted to reduce vehicle miles traveled and to 
purchase more fuel efficient vehicles, it is natural to ask what expected impact these 
changes would have on CNG adoption rates. Interestingly, both types of anticipated 
reactions to increased gasoline prices (reduced VMT and more fuel efficient gasoline 
vehicles) predict lower CNG adoption rates. Intuitively, this is because the expected fuel 
cost savings associated with CNG will be lower if the consumer drives fewer miles or has 
a more fuel-efficient vehicle. Observing that that the derivative of the present discount 
value of total cost savings associated with switching to CNG with respect to vehicle miles 
traveled is positive, while the derivative associated with MPG is negative, as shown below 
easily shows this. 
Recall that the present discount value of total cost savings associated with 
switching to CNG can be expressed as:    
(4-6)  ∆𝑇𝐶 = (𝑉𝑔0
∗ − 𝑉𝑐0
∗ ) + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 (𝑓𝑔 − 𝑓𝑐). 
This can be rearranged as: 
(4-7)  ∆𝑇𝐶 = (𝑉𝑔0
∗ − 𝑉𝑐0
∗ ) + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐) (
𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
), 
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where (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑃𝑐) is the fuel price differential which is assumed positive. The derivatives of 
this expression with respect to 𝑉𝑀𝑇 and 𝑀𝑃𝐺, therefore, are: 
(4-8)  
𝜕∆𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑉𝑀𝑇
=
1
𝑀𝑃𝐺
∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐) > 0 
(4-9)  
𝜕∆𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑀𝑃𝐺
= − (
𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺2
) ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑇𝑡=0 (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐) < 0. 
Interestingly, these expressions indicate that as the vehicle fleet becomes more 
fuel efficient and consumers drive less in response to rising gasoline costs, these changes 
actually undermine the incentive for consumers to adopt CNG vehicles. This effect is due 
to the fact that consumers face many substitute alternatives to dealing with higher gasoline 
prices. CNG adoption is one alternative, however, other alternatives include changing 
driving patterns and adopting more fuel-efficient gasoline vehicles.  
4.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Using the baseline parameters, the research indicates that the proportion of the 
vehicle fleet that would find a CNG fuel system economically advantageous is small. This 
prediction reflects the reality of the current market. Simulations suggest that a substantial 
decrease in the vehicle price differential for CNG vehicles is necessary to induce CNG 
vehicle adoption for a significant portion of the vehicle fleet. Moreover, the model predicts 
that even if technology improvements allow for lower conversion costs or manufacturer 
vehicle price differentials, CNG vehicle are likely to remain a minority in the vehicle fleet.  
Importantly, the research found that the fuel price differential necessary to predict CNG 
adoption for more than 50% of the vehicle fleet is more than $5.00—roughly twice the 
largest historically observed price differential and about fifty standard deviations larger 
than the mean of the historical distribution. Within the range of historically observed fuel 
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price differentials, predicted CNG adoption rates are low. Little variation is found in 
predicted CNG adoption rates with respect to the other model parameters. 
While the model predicts that overall CNG adoption rates will be low, a few caveats 
are in order. First, even at current prices, a non-zero proportion of the vehicle fleet is 
predicted to adopt CNG. This proportion is likely to grow as infrastructure becomes 
available, particularly if CNG vehicle prices fall. CNG vehicles make sense for consumers 
who drive many miles and are willing to live with the inconveniences associated with CNG 
vehicles. Second, the model is based on the current vehicle fleet. Changes in the vehicle 
fleet composition and changes in driving habits will affect the analysis. However, as 
gasoline prices continue to rise and consumers respond by driving less and purchasing 
more fuel-efficient vehicles, the potential gains from CNG vehicle adoption are smaller 
than otherwise.  Finally, the model suggests that CNG is most likely to be cost effective 
for high mileage, low MPG vehicles like service trucks, buses, and delivery vehicles. 
Moreover, these vehicles are also less likely to be negatively affected by the 
inconvenience of more frequent refueling. 
To summarize, in order for CNG vehicles to become a significant portion of the 
passenger vehicle fleet, several conditions must be met: 
4.6.1. Decreased Vehicle Price Differential 
First, the vehicle price differential between CNG vehicle and gasoline vehicles would 
need to be reduced. There is potential for this price differential to shrink if manufacturers 
scale up production and conversion kits becomes more widely available and cheaper to 
install. However, even as costs fall due to economies of scale, there will likely continue to 
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be a substantial vehicle price premium due to the technological requirements associated 
with a compressed gas fuel system.  
4.6.2. Increased Fuel Price Differential 
Second, the CNG-gasoline fuel price differential would need to increase. This 
increase is possible given that supply and demand factors for CNG are more regionally 
based than for gasoline. However, natural gas and petroleum are substitutes in some 
markets and growing price differentials would serve to increase relative demand for natural 
gas, thus limiting the extent to which price differentials could grow.  
4.6.3. Limited Transportation Technological Improvements 
Third, another condition that must be met for widespread CNG adoption would be 
the absence or limited impact of any other technological improvements to vehicle 
efficiency. For example, a substantial improvement in battery technology could make 
electric-hybrid vehicles relatively more fuel-cost-effective than CNG vehicles, even if the 
gasoline-CNG price differential is large. An alternative interpretation of this condition is 
that technological improvements in CNG vehicle technology would need to at least keep 
pace with vehicle technological improvements in general. 
4.6.4. Expanded Fueling Infrastructure and Vehicle Availability 
Finally, under current conditions, CNG vehicles are not a viable option for many 
consumers. In the absence of a widely available fueling network, CNG vehicle adoption 
will be limited to specific geographic areas where CNG fueling stations exist. Likewise, 
without greatly expanded vehicle supply, CNG vehicles will remain a tiny fraction of the 
overall fleet. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF NATURAL GAS VEHICLE ADOPTION ON EMISSIONS OF 
CARBON DIOXIDE IN THE LIGHT DUTY VEHICLE FLEET4 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Natural gas competes with oil as an energy fuel. Historically, on energy parity 
basis, natural gas and oil have been fairly price competitive. Figure 5.1 depicts this 
historical relationship. However, due to technological constraints of using a pressurized 
gas as a fuel source natural gas has not competed with gasoline as a transportation fuel. 
In recent years the price of natural gas fell relative to oil. The decrease in price of natural 
gas relative to oil makes natural gas more attractive as a transportation fuel (Dondero & 
Goldemberg, 2005; Gwilliam, 2000; Janssen, Lienin, Gassmann, & Wokaun, 2006; Matic, 
2005). Yeh (2007) finds that for wide spread adoption retail natural gas needs to be priced 
at least 40%-50% less than conventional gasoline.  
Natural Gas is also less carbon intensive than gasoline or diesel fuel, and therefore 
the adoption of natural gas powered vehicles has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from the transportation sector. However, these reductions depend on 
the rate at which consumers and firms adopt natural gas powered vehicles. In this study, 
we provide estimates of the potential for carbon emission reductions from the light-duty 
fleet in the United States. In addition, we compare the costs of carbon emission reductions 
via subsidies for natural gas vehicle adoption with the costs of carbon abatement from 
other strategies. Overall, we conclude that  CNG adoption is unlikely to produce 
                                               
4 This chapter was co-authored with Ryan Bosworth, Kevin Heaslip, and Ali Soltani-Sobh.  
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substantial reductions in carbon emissions at current fuel and vehicle prices and that fuel 
and vehicle subsidies spur further adoption represent a relatively costly form of carbon 
abatement.    
We begin by briefly reviewing the chemistry of emissions that makes carbon 
emission reductions via CNG adoption possible. This information is then combined with 
an economic model designed to predict compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicle adoption 
rates in the light-duty vehicle sector. Our model produces a range of estimates of carbon 
emission reductions from the light-duty vehicle sector for given CNG vehicle and fuel price 
conditions. We conclude with a discussion of the overall potential for carbon emission 
reductions due to CNG vehicle adoption.   
 
 
Figure 5-1. The Growing price advantage of natural gas relative to oil 
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5.2. Chemistry of Emissions 
Given the stoichiometric formula for the combustion of gasoline (octane),  
(5-1)  2C8H18 + 25O2  →   16CO2 + 18H2O 
It is known that every 1 mol of fuel that is burned will lead to approximately 8 mol 
of CO2. Using this ratio and the atomic weight of each atom in the chemical formula leads 
to the conclusion that for every pound of fuel burned 3.08 pounds of carbon dioxide is 
produced. The specific gravity of gasoline is 0.75g/ml at STP (Mackay et. al. 2006), or 
6.259 lbs./gal, indicating that one gallon of gasoline will produce about 19.3 lbs. of CO2. 
Information about the fuel efficiency and the vehicle miles traveled (VMT) of the fleet can 
then be used to compute the approximate number of gallons that the fleet will consume in 
a given year. 
Similarly, the chemical formula for the combustion of natural gas (methane), 
(5-2)  CH4 + 2O2  →   2H2O + CO2 
combined with the information on the atomic weights of each of the elements allows for 
the calculation that the ratio of CO2 produced to natural gas burned, by weight, will be 
2.743. Finally, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “1 
Gasoline gallon (US) equivalent (GGE) means 2.567 kg (5.660 lb.) of natural gas.” 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). Therefore burning one GGE of 
compressed natural gas would yield 15.5 lbs. of CO2. These calculations indicate that 
switching from burning gasoline to burning natural gas could represent a 19.6% reduction 
in CO2 emissions. It is noted therefore, that the absolute upper bound on emission 
reductions due to CNG adoption alone is around 20%--even with 100% adoption rates, 
carbon emissions cannot fall more than 20% without reductions in vehicle usage rates or 
improvements in fuel economy.  
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It is important to note that these reactions are idealized. We assume throughout 
the paper perfect combustion of the fuel. There is no unreacted or partially reacted fuel, 
nor contaminants in the fuel. These types of imperfections create other types of emissions 
such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs), sulfur dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), 
Carbonyl Compounds (e.g. formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, acrolein) and particulate matter 
(pm10 and pm2.5) (Hesterberg, Lapin, & Bunn, 2008; Karavalakis, Durbin, Villela, & Miller, 
2012). Natural gas produces less of these emissions than gasoline (Evans & Blaszczyk, 
1997), and the co-benefits of eliminating these criteria pollutants could contribute to the 
decision to implement policies designed to increase adoption of natural gas vehicles. 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) estimate the marginal social damages for a number of 
these criteria pollutants. 
5.3. Light-Duty Vehicle Fleet 
The basic economic decision of whether or not to convert an existing vehicle to a 
compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicle is driven by simple factors (conversion costs, fuel 
prices, etc.) for the light-duty vehicle fleet. We assume consumers would choose to 
convert an existing vehicle to a natural gas vehicle (NGV) if the costs of converting and 
operating that vehicle are lower than the costs of purchasing and operating a comparable 
conventional fuel vehicle. This approach leads to a consumer choice model that depends 
on the option value of converting the vehicle. 
A rich literature exists on real option values in the vehicle market. Rust (1987) 
develops a model of the optimal replacement of bus engines. Moretto (2000) models the 
decision to participate in a vehicle scrappage program with uncertain future benefits and 
costs. Camargo et al. (2010) use a real option model to describe the choice between 
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purchasing a flex-fuel vehicle over a gasoline vehicle in the Brazilian auto market. Bastian-
Pinto, Brandão, & de Lemos Alves (2010) also examine the utility benefits that Brazilian 
consumers gain from flex-fuel vehicles under fuel price uncertainty. Avadikyan and 
Llerena (2010) investigate the automotive industry’s incentives to invest in hybrid vehicles 
using a real options approach. García and Miguel (2012) use a real options approach to 
investigate whether or not electric vehicles are an attractive option to Spanish consumers.  
The individual will choose the vehicle with the lowest present discounted cost of 
all monetary flows. The model for NGV conversion can be envisioned as an individual 
choosing between two identical vehicles that differ only in their fuel system and initial 
purchase price, because we can capitalize the conversion costs into the purchase price. 
At first glance, this assumption appears to ignore important work done on vehicle choice 
modelling5, where consumers receive utility from other attributes of the vehicle other than 
strictly monetary costs. However, the strictly monetary model presented in this paper 
describes the purely financial choice of whether or not the consumer should convert an 
existing vehicle to run on natural gas.  
We also assume that all associated costs of ownership such as maintenance, 
registration fees, property taxes, etc. are identical across both vehicle types. The primary 
variables that consumers must account for in this calculation are the purchase price of the 
vehicle, the price of the fuel, expected vehicle miles traveled (VMT), fuel efficiency (MPG), 
and the expected useful life of the vehicle.  
                                               
5  Brownstone, Bunch, and Train (2000), for example, illustrate the importance of combining 
revealed preference data with stated preference data to control and obtain realistic values for 
various vehicle attributes. Our approach does not account for these various attributes because we 
assume that the stock vehicle and the converted vehicle will share these attributes, and therefore 
the value of these attributes will be lost when the stock vehicle is differenced with the converted 
vehicle. These values are therefore irrelevant to our calculations. 
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(5-3)  𝑇𝐶𝑔 = 𝑉𝑔0 + 𝑓𝑔0 + 𝑓𝑔1(1 + 𝑟)
−1 + ⋯ + 𝑓𝑔𝑇(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑇 − 𝑉𝑔0(1 + 𝛿)
−𝑇(1 + 𝑟)−𝑇 . 
This equation simply states that the total cost of ownership of a gasoline vehicle is 
the original purchase price of the vehicle less any residual value discounted to the present, 
plus the discounted value of a flow of fuel costs. A comparable relationship can be stated 
for an NGV. Recognizing that fuel costs are a linear transformation of fuel consumption, 
specifically: 
(5-4)   𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑡
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑡
 
We further assume that fuel consumption is equal in each period and that fuel 
prices are constant. The assumption of constant fuel consumption comes from the 
assumption that driver habits are stable across time, and that fuel efficiency will be 
unaffected by conversion. Finally, we assume that future fuel prices are constant under 
the assumption that the best predictor of future fuel prices is the current fuel price therefore 
consumers are assumed to use the current fuel price to estimate future fuel costs. 
Substituting the expression for fuel costs in Equation 2 into Equation 1, collecting the terms 
containing the original purchase price into one term, and rearranging the formula gives the 
following result: 
(5-5)   𝑇𝐶𝑔 = 𝑉𝑔0
∗ + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡𝑓𝑔
𝑇
𝑡=0 . 
Subtracting this equation from the comparable equation for NGVs and substituting 
the expressions for fuel costs into the model gives the basis for the consumer’s decision. 
𝑉𝑔0
∗  is the difference between the current value and the discounted residual value of the 
vehicle at period 𝑇. Specifically, the consumer will decide to convert if the option value of 
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conversion is positive. It is convenient to define the consumer’s choice problem as an 
indicator function for when CNG is provides a positive option value to the consumer. 
(5-6)   𝜙𝑖,𝑗 = {
1   if   (𝑉𝑔0
∗ − 𝑉𝑐0
∗ ) + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡(𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐) (
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
)𝑇𝑡=0 > 0
0    otherwise
 
This equation states that, when a NGV is cost effective (has a positive option value) 
for the ith, jth VMT / MPG pair, 𝜙𝑖,𝑗 will take on the value of unity. Otherwise, when an NGV 
is less cost effective (has a negative option value of conversion) than a conventional 
gasoline vehicle, 𝜙𝑖,𝑗  will take on the value of zero. Essentially, the decision criterion 
measures the option value of purchasing a natural gas vehicle. For positive option values, 
the consumer switches to natural gas. 
Using data from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey (United States 
Department of Transportation, 2009), the proportion of the fleet that falls into specific MPG 
/ VMT combinations is computed. With assumptions about the purchase price differential, 
and fuel price differential, the proportion of the fleet that would find NGVs to be financially 
advantageous can be calculated. These predicted adoption rates can be found in table 
4.3 of this dissertation. The portion of the fleet that is most likely to adopt NGVs are the 
high VMT and low MPG combinations—the dirtiest vehicles in terms of carbon output.  
Because these high VMT, low MPG vehicles can be considered the dirtiest portion 
of the fleet, these conversions can be expected to be the most helpful in terms of reduced 
CO2 emissions. However, the size of these reductions depends crucially on whether or 
not the proportion of the fleet, as represented by these VMT / MPG combinations that find 
NGVs cost effective, is sufficiently large. 
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5.4. Calculating Emissions 
Knowledge of a vehicle’s fuel consumption rate and miles traveled allows for the 
computation of the number of gallons of fuel being consumed. Specifically the fuel being 
consumed by a vehicle is the ratio of VMT to MPG, 
(5-7)  𝐶 =
𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
 
This figure, combined with knowledge of the chemistry of emissions for different 
fuels allows for the calculation of the level of emissions for each VMT / MPG combination 
within the fleet. The level of emissions is simply a constant proportion of the fuel consumed 
by weight,  
(5-8)  𝑒𝑀𝑃𝐺,𝑉𝑀𝑇 = 𝑘𝑖𝐶𝑀𝑃𝐺,𝑉𝑀𝑇 ,    
where 𝑓𝑀𝑃𝐺,𝑉𝑀𝑇 and 𝑒𝑀𝑃𝐺,𝑉𝑀𝑇 is the fuel consumed and level of emissions, respectively, in 
units of weight for the MPG/VMT pair. The constant 𝑘𝑖 is specific to each fuel type: the 
appropriate 𝑘𝑖 for gasoline is given as 𝑘𝑔 = 3.08 and for natural gas as 𝐾𝑐 = 2.74. These 
values are idealized in the sense that the formulae does not account for unreacted fuel, 
impurities, etc. 
The total reduction of emissions due to NGV conversion will be a function of fuel 
consumed by the fleet, the proportion of the fleet that does convert, and the distribution of 
fleet VMT and MPG. Therefore the total level of emissions is modeled by the function, 
(5-9)  𝑇𝐸 = ℎ ∑ ∑ [𝜙𝑖,𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
𝑝𝑖,𝑗 + (1 − 𝜙𝑖,𝑗)𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
𝑝𝑖,𝑗]𝑗𝑖 , 
where 𝑇𝐸 is the total emissions from both natural gas and gasoline powered vehicles.𝑘 is 
the emissions to fuel consumed ratio, and the subscripts indicate either natural gas (𝑐), or 
gasoline (𝑔). 𝑤 is the conversion factor from a volume based measure to a weight based 
measure for natural gas and gasoline, where the subscripts are the same as above. 𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖 
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indicates the ith level of VMT. Consumers are also assumed to have a well-known 
behavioral response in the number of miles driven after converting to CNG due to the 
lower fuel price. This behavioral response is a phenomenon known as the rebound effect 
(Greene, 2012; Small & Van Dender, 2007; Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, & Sommerville, 2009). 
The rebound effect is an income effect that occurs due to the lower price per mile driven 
(Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008). 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗 indicates the j
th MPG level. 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 is the proportion of 
the fleet that has the VMT / MPG combination of (VMTi , MPGj). Finally, ℎ represents the 
total fleet size. 
The model requires an estimate of the difference in the cost of the two vehicles in 
order to compute the value of . This calculation depends on estimates for many 
parameter values. The parameters used in this calculation are summarized in Table 5.1. 
The total level of emissions based on these assumptions, and data for the vehicle fleet is 
842.36 million tons of CO2. The baseline model’s parameters were subjected to a 
sensitivity analysis. The length of ownership was based on the estimated average length 
of vehicle ownership by Kelly Blue Book to be 60 months. The model above, therefore 
assumes a payback period of five years. This assumption is immediately suspect because 
of studies that look at the payback periods for fuel savings find that the typical consumer 
only considers the first three years of fuel savings (Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005). 
This study may, therefore, overestimate the financial benefit of converting a vehicle to 
natural gas. The overestimate of these benefits will imply that the reduction in CO2 
emissions will also be overestimated. The authors find that any overestimation in the 
reduction of the CO2 emissions cannot qualitatively change the conclusions drawn.  
 
,i j
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Table 5-1. Baseline Parameter Values  
Parameter Value 
Length of Ownership 60 months 
Purchase Price Differential $7000 
Fuel Price Differential $1.50 
Discount Rate 6% 
Depreciation Rate 15% 
Rebound Effect Elasticity 0.22 
  
 
Furthermore, correcting this overestimation can only strengthen the final conclusions the 
authors draw, and therefore reducing the payback period from 5 years to 3 years is moot.  
The baseline purchase price differential reflects two important aspects of the car. 
The first is the actual cost of conversion. The cost of conversion can be affected by the cost 
of materials and labor. These conversions can cost between $2000 and $4000. The $4000 
cost of conversion is most likely an overestimate. It is based primarily on the price difference 
between a Honda Civic GX (the natural gas version of the civic) and a Honda Civic EX (the 
most comparably equipped version of a Civic) (Werpy, Santini, Burnham, & Mintz, 2009). 
Under the Alternative Motor Fuels Act, manufactures of CNG vehicles may receive special 
fuel economy credits. Therefore, the $4000 premium on this OEM vehicle may be more of 
a marketing strategy than actual cost of production. We, therefore, take the $4000 as the 
first part of this baseline purchase price premium as an upper-bound on the cost of 
retrofitting a vehicle to use CNG. The second part of this premium includes an 
“inconvenience premium” due to switching to a natural gas fuel. The inconvenience premium 
accounts for the lack of infrastructure (Kirk, Bristow, & Zanni, 2014), reduced power (Evans 
& Blaszczyk, 1997), reduced trunk space due to safety requirements of placing the fuel tank 
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in the trunk of the vehicle, and making the vehicle heavier to reinforce valves and other 
components to handle a pressurized gas instead of a liquid fuel. This inconvenience 
premium is based on the work of Walls (1996) and adjusted for inflation, approximately 
$3000. Combining the estimates of the cost to convert a vehicle with the inconvenience 
premium yields an estimated purchase price premium of $7000. We allow this parameter to 
vary significantly in the sensitivity analysis due to the high uncertainty associated with our 
baseline figure. We allow this figure to range between $3000 and $10,000. 
The baseline fuel price differential was based on a rough estimate of the national 
gasoline-CNG price differential in the United States in April 2013. Due to the inherent 
volatility of both of these price series, we allow the price differential to vary in our sensitivity 
analysis. We allow the price differential to range between $1.20 and $2.50 per gallon.  
A baseline depreciation rate of 15% was used for this analysis (Feng, Fullerton, & Gan, 
2005), and a baseline discount rate of 6% was used. For these parameters, the level of 
emissions was not very sensitive to changes. They were most sensitive to changes in the 
purchase price differential and changes in the fuel price differential. Table 5.2 shows the 
total level of emissions in the U.S.  
In order for these results to be meaningfully interpreted it is necessary to establish 
a benchmark level of emissions. The model’s prediction for the emissions level without 
any conversions to NGVs in the fleet as the benchmark level is used. This level of 
emissions is calculated by the following formula: 
(5-10)  𝑇𝐸∗ = ℎ ∑ ∑ 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
 𝑝𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑖 ,  
where 𝑇𝐸∗ is the benchmark level of emissions, and all other values in the formula share 
the same interpretation as the previous formula. 
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Table 5-2. Predicted Total Level of Carbon Emissions for United States  
(Light-Duty Vehicles, Millions of Short Tons)  
    Purchase Price Differential 
    $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 $7000 $8000 $9000 $10000 
F
u
e
l 
P
ri
c
e
 D
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
l 
$1.20 839.61 842.02 842.33 842.37 842.37 842.37 842.39 842.39 
$1.30 838.67 841.52 842.30 842.36 842.37 842.37 842.39 842.39 
$1.40 837.74 840.94 842.20 842.33 842.37 842.37 842.39 842.39 
$1.50 837.14 840.31 842.02 842.31 842.36 842.37 842.39 842.39 
$1.60 836.44 839.61 841.62 842.28 842.34 842.37 842.39 842.39 
$1.70 835.86 838.98 841.20 842.16 842.33 842.36 842.38 842.39 
$1.80 835.30 838.21 840.68 842.02 842.30 842.34 842.37 842.39 
$1.90 834.80 837.74 840.15 841.71 842.24 842.33 842.36 842.38 
$2.00 834.45 837.14 839.61 841.42 842.14 842.31 842.34 842.37 
$2.10 833.90 836.66 839.09 840.94 842.02 842.30 842.33 842.36 
$2.20 833.67 836.09 838.60 840.52 841.71 842.24 842.23 842.34 
$2.30 833.38 835.70 838.18 840.02 841.48 842.13 842.30 842.34 
$2.40 833.13 835.30 837.66 839.61 841.08 842.02 842.28 842.33 
$2.50 832.93 834.93 837.14 839.17 840.72 841.83 842.24 842.31 
  
 
 Finally, the difference between the predicted level of emissions, 𝑇𝐸, and the benchmark 
level of emissions, 𝑇𝐸∗ is calculated as: 
(5-11)  ∆𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸 − 𝑇𝐸∗ < 0 
The negative sign on this expression indicates that the change is a reduction of total 
emissions. Substituting the formulae for 𝑇𝐸 and 𝑇𝐸∗  n this expression and rearranging 
yields the following formula:  
(5-12)  ∆𝐸 = (𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐 − 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔) ∑ ∑ [𝜙𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑖,𝑗
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
] .𝑗𝑖   
This formula states that the reduction in emissions attributable to NGVs is simply the 
reduction of emissions from only the vehicles that do convert to NGVs.  
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Table 5-3. Predicted Percentage Carbon Emission Reductions for United States  
(Light-Duty Vehicles)  
    Purchase Price Differential 
    $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000 $7000 $8000 $9000 $10000 
F
u
e
l 
P
ri
c
e
 D
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
l 
$1.20 0.33% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.30 0.44% 0.10% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.40 0.55% 0.17% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.50 0.62% 0.25% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.60 0.71% 0.33% 0.09% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.70 0.77% 0.40% 0.14% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.80 0.84% 0.50% 0.20% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
$1.90 0.90% 0.55% 0.27% 0.08% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
$2.00 0.94% 0.62% 0.33% 0.11% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 
$2.10 1.01% 0.68% 0.39% 0.17% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 
$2.20 1.03% 0.75% 0.45% 0.22% 0.08% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 
$2.30 1.07% 0.79% 0.50% 0.28% 0.11% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 
$2.40 1.10% 0.84% 0.56% 0.33% 0.15% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 
$2.50 1.12% 0.89% 0.62% 0.38% 0.20% 0.07% 0.02% 0.01% 
 
 
The percentage reduction of emissions from the benchmark conditions due to a change 
in market conditions (fuel and vehicle prices) is given in Table 5.3. 
5.5. Discussion of LDV Results 
These results indicate that under the baseline conditions NGV adoption has the 
potential to reduce CO2 emissions from the light-duty vehicle fleet by about 0.0037%. 
These small reductions are primarily due to the small portion of the light-duty vehicle fleet 
for which NGVs are an economically viable alternative. Sensitivity analysis indicates that 
with an extremely large fuel price differential ($2.50) and a substantially smaller vehicle 
price differential ($3000), CO2 emission reductions of about 1.16% (Washington) and 
1.12% (U.S.) are plausible for the light-duty vehicle fleet. 
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Some comparative statics may be helpful in understanding why the potential for 
GHG emission reductions from converting part of the fleet to NGV is so small. The first 
comparative static is the change in the reduction of emissions due to a change in VMT.  
(5-13)  
𝜕∆𝐸
𝜕𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
= (𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐 − 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔) ∑
𝜙𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
< 0𝑗 . 
Keeping in mind that ∆𝐸 < 0, this formula says that the size of the reduction will increase 
as VMT increases, because
 
(𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐 − 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔) < 0. Intuitively, this is logical because as VMT 
increases, so will fuel consumption. Therefore, the reduction in emissions will be amplified 
for the part of the fleet that converts to NGVs. 
The next comparative static result is that lower MPG portions of the fleet will 
contribute more to the overall reduction: 
(5-14)  
𝜕∆𝐸
𝜕𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
= (𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔 − 𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐) ∑ [𝜙𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑖,𝑗
𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑗
2] > 0𝑖 . 
This comparative static says that, as fuel economy increases, the reduction in the 
emissions level will become smaller. These two comparative static results indicate that the 
greatest reductions in emissions by switching to natural gas will be the part of the fleet 
with high miles and low fuel economy. In other words, the dirtiest part of the fleet would 
reduce the most per capita emissions by switching to NGVs and the additional benefit of 
additional adoptions in terms of CO2 emission reductions will be subject to diminishing 
returns due to the greater fuel efficiency and lower VMT of later adoptions. It is also 
important to consider that, while the dirtiest part of the fleet is predisposed to adopting 
NGVs and this part of the fleet would also contribute the most (per-vehicle) to the reduction 
of emissions, this portion of the vehicle fleet is small in absolute terms.  
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These results imply an elasticity of emissions with respect to NGV adoption rates 
of approximately -0.1969. This elasticity is fairly constant due primarily to the chemistry of 
emissions. Natural gas (methane), when combusted, emits about 19.7% less carbon 
dioxide than gasoline (octane). The stability of this ratio allows for a generalization to 
extreme values of the adoption rates. Increasing the proportion of the NGV fleet will reduce 
emissions. This can be seen by the comparative static result, 
(5-15)  
𝜕𝑒𝜋,𝑡
𝜕𝜋
= 𝐶𝜋,𝑡(𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐 − 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔) < 0. 
The result can be signed because 𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔 > 𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐. Using this comparative static, the 
elasticity of emissions with respect to the proportion of the NGVs in the fleet that switches 
can be calculated as 
(5-16)  𝜀𝑒 =
𝜋(𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐−𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔)
[(1−𝜋)𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔+𝜋𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐]
< 0. 
The elasticity is negative because of the previous comparative static result. Furthermore, 
this elasticity can be used to derive a condition for when it will be inelastic. That condition 
is 
(5-17)  𝜋 <
𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔
2(𝑘𝑔𝑤𝑔−𝑘𝑐𝑤𝑐)
. 
The LHS of this expression is bound by the unit interval. The RHS is a constant that is 
based on the chemistry of emissions, and is equal to 2.54. The LHS of this expression is 
always less than the RHS; therefore the elasticity of emissions with respect to adoption 
rates is always inelastic.   
The inelastic nature of emissions with respect to the adoption rates suggests that 
converting even a relative large proportion of the fleet to natural gas is unlikely to 
dramatically reduce GHG emissions.  
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5.6. Policy Implications 
The model developed thus far has three main policy levers which can be used to 
achieve additional abatement. The first of these policy levers is a subsidy on the purchase 
of a NGV. The second policy lever that this model provides is a tax on gasoline 
consumption. In practice the reasons for implementing gasoline taxes are generally the 
maintenance of infrastructure. Pollution control is a secondary concern. Furthermore, our 
model already accounts for the current gasoline tax in the gasoline fuel prices used. 
Therefore, the analysis that follows assumes an increase in the gasoline tax as an 
abatement technology. The final policy lever that is available in this model is a subsidy on 
natural gas paid at the pump. This policy would lower NGV’s operation costs and thus 
make the conversion to a NGV more attractive. 
Each of these policy levers operates by reducing the relative cost of owning a NGV 
relative to a conventional vehicle. These policy levers then give rise to substitution and 
income effects. For the cases of subsidizing natural gas as a fuel and subsidizing NGVs, 
the substitution, or adoption effect, lowers GHG emissions, while the income effect erodes 
the abatement from the adoption effect. Whereas for an increase in the gasoline tax the 
opposite is true, the income effect reduces emissions, and the adoption effect erodes the 
reductions in emissions gained from the income effect. 
5.6.1. Subsidizing NGVs 
Figure 2 depicts the estimated marginal abatement cost curve for the subsidizing 
NGVs. Each point on the figure indicates a $1000 increment to the subsidy. The estimated 
marginal abatement costs increase from $1,274/ton CO2 to $5,750/ton CO2. Over this 
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range of prices the amount of CO2 abated increases from essentially zero tons to over 40 
million tons.  
The curve is upward sloping, which is the theoretically expected relationship. The 
upward sloping nature of this curve satisfies the necessary condition for finding the socially 
optimal level of abatement. However, the large starting price on this curve, namely 
$1,274/ton CO2, suggests that the sufficient conditions probably will not be satisfied since 
other abatement programs with smaller marginal abatement costs, like the Cash for 
Clunkers program of 2009, are considered environmentally inefficient (Knittel, 2009; Li, 
Linn, & Spiller, 2013). A socially optimal subsidy using this policy lever is possible, but 
unlikely. 
5.6.2. Increasing the Gasoline Tax 
The effect of increasing the gasoline tax on emissions was simulated by increasing 
the price of gasoline in ten cent intervals. The model estimates at baseline parameter 
values the tons of CO2 emitted for each increase. Fuel consumption is estimated by 
dividing the VMT by the MPG for each value in the empirical joint probability distribution 
for these two variables. The weighted average of fuel consumption is calculated using the 
probability of a VMT / MPG pair as the weights. This average is then multiplied by the total 
fleet size to get the fleet’s annual fuel consumption. The total fuel consumption is multiplied 
by the increase in the gasoline tax to estimate the cost of the increase to consumers. This 
cost is divided by the decrease in the gasoline tax to arrive at an estimated marginal 
abatement cost. The marginal abatement cost for an increase in the gasoline tax is 
depicted in Figure 3. Each marked point on the marginal abatement cost curve represents 
an increase (from left to right) in the gasoline tax of an additional 10 cents. 
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Figure 5-2. Marginal abatement cost of subsidizing NGVs 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Marginal abatement cost of gasoline tax 
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The most prominent feature of this marginal abatement cost curve is that it is 
decreasing in emissions. The decreasing marginal abatement cost is somewhat 
counterintuitive because conventional economic theory suggests that marginal abatement 
costs should be increasing. This decrease, however, reflects the ability of consumers to 
substitute to alternative fuels. The model predicts that as the gasoline tax increases 
consumers will attempt to avoid the tax by switching from conventional gasoline to natural 
gas. Adoption of NGVs begins with the most polluting vehicles first, but they represent a 
small portion of the fleet. As more consumers adopt natural gas to avoid the tax, tax 
revenues begin to fall. At the same time the remaining gasoline vehicles are driven less 
intensively. Therefore the combined effect of adopting NGVs and the income effect 
response decrease tax revenues more rapidly than the increase from the rising tax rate. 
These effects account for the joint decrease in emissions and marginal abatement costs. 
Decreasing marginal abatement costs have serious implications for the existence 
and uniqueness of a socially optimal solution. Particularly, the downward sloping marginal 
abatement cost curve implies non-convexities in the abatement technology in question.  
Finally, the marginal abatement costs, despite decreasing over the relevant range, 
are very large. The model predicts that the marginal abatement costs of increasing the 
gasoline tax are between $943 /ton CO2 and $1,465 /ton CO2. These large costs probably 
preclude the existence of a socially optimal level of emissions. 
5.6.3. Subsidizing Natural Gas as a Transportation Fuel 
 To simulate the effect of subsidizing natural gas as a fuel, the price of natural gas 
was decreased incrementally by 10 cents. The model was otherwise evaluated at baseline 
parameter values. The total cost of the program was calculated in a similar fashion as the 
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increase to the gasoline tax. The fuel consumption for each VMT / MPG pair was 
calculated for each pair in the joint probability distribution for which natural gas was 
financially advantageous. The weighted average of these values was calculated using the 
probabilities as weights. This calculation gave total natural gas fuel consumption, which 
was multiplied by the subsidy. The model produced estimates of CO2 emissions. The total 
cost of the program was divided by the total emissions abated to give an estimate of the 
marginal abatement costs. 
Figure 5.4 depicts the marginal abatement costs of subsidizing natural gas as a 
transportation fuel. Each point (from left to right) indicates an increase of an additional 10 
cents to the fuel subsidy that ranges from $0.10 to $1.50. The marginal abatement cost 
curve for this program is backward-bending. The backward bending marginal abatement 
cost curve is caused by tension between the substitution and income effects. NGV 
adoption decreases total emissions, but it comes with cheaper fuel. The less expensive 
fuel encourages the vehicle to be driven more intensively. As the operating costs of the 
vehicle decrease beyond a critical threshold, the decrease in emissions is overwhelmed 
by the increase in the behavioral response to low fuel costs. In the rebound effect literature 
this net increase is known as backfire (Druckman, Chitnis, Sorrell, & Jackson, 2011; 
Madlener & Alcott, 2009; Sorrell, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2009). The model suggests that at 
baseline parameter values backfire occurs at $1.30 subsidy to natural gas fuel. This level 
for the subsidy implies a marginal abatement cost of $4,602/ t CO2.  A rational social 
planner would not place a subsidy greater than this amount on natural gas fuels. We, 
therefore, consider this to be the upper bound on the relevant range for this type of 
subsidy. 
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Figure 5-4. Marginal abatement cost of subsidizing natural gas as transportation 
fuel 
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5.7. Cost Effectiveness of NGVs 
The cost effectiveness of policies designed to decrease emissions by increasing 
NGV adoption can be compared to alternative abatement programs.  Table 5.4 lists a few 
alternative abatement programs. These programs differ significantly from each other in 
terms of abatement technology.  
Electric vehicles are the most comparable in terms of program attributes. The 
purchase of an electric vehicle is a similar decision to the purchase of an NGV. Electric 
vehicles, in contrast to NGVs, eliminate all tailpipe CO2 emissions. This elimination of 
tailpipe emissions substantially decreases the marginal abatement cost estimates for this 
class of vehicles. Electric vehicles do not directly emit CO2, but the generation of electricity 
to charge their batteries does. On the basis of these indirect emissions, Kesicki (2012) 
estimates the abatement costs of electric vehicles. Kok, Annema, and van Wee (2011) 
investigate the influence of methodological differences on the marginal abatement costs, 
and present a range of estimates from the literature. These estimates range between $67/t 
CO2 - $507/t CO2. Electric vehicles are therefore, a more cost effective abatement 
technology than natural gas. Estimates of the marginal abatement cost for electric vehicles 
range between $67/t CO2 to $507/t CO2. Additionally, the federal tax incentive for hybrid 
electric vehicles has a CO2 abatement cost of $177/ t CO2. 
In comparison to subsidizing natural gas, the federal government already has a 
program to subsidize the blending of ethanol with gasoline. This program expired in 2011. 
Metcalf (2008) estimated the implied CO2 abatement costs of this program at $1700 /t 
CO2.  This figure is most comparable to our estimates of the implied cost of abatement by 
encouraging the conversion of vehicles to natural gas. 
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Table 5-4. Comparison of Marginal Abatement Costs 
Policy Marginal Abatement Cost  Sources 
CNG Vehicle subsidy $1,274/t CO2  - $5,750/t CO2 This study 
Gasoline tax  $943/t CO2  -  $1,465/t CO2  This study 
CNG fuel subsidy $372/t CO2  -  $7,796/t CO2  This study 
Electric Vehicles $67/t CO2 - $507/t CO2 
Kok et al. (2011) 
Kesicki (2012) 
Cash for Clunkers $92 /t CO2 - $365 /t CO2 
Li et al. (2013) 
Knittel (2009) 
Waxman Markey bill –(Cap 
and Trade) 
$17/t CO2 - $22/t CO2 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(2009) 
Ethanol Excise Tax Credit $1700 /t CO2 Metcalf (2008) 
Hybrid Vehicle Income Tax 
Credit 
$177 /t CO2 Beresteanu & Li(2011) 
 
 
The cash for clunkers program was a popular economic stimulus program during 
the financial crisis of 2008. This policy was designed to provide financial stimulus to the 
economy, while improving the fleet’s fuel economy. The Cash for Clunkers (CfC) program 
is often described as being inefficient in terms of reducing emissions because the program 
probably just shifted demand from adjacent time periods to the program time frame (Li et 
al., 2013). This program, however, was more cost efficient at reducing emissions than any 
policy designed to increase NGV adoption considered in this paper. Knittel (2009) gives a 
rough estimate of the abatement costs of CO2 under the CfC program. His entire range 
($237 /t CO2 - $365 /t CO2) of marginal abatement costs for the cash for clunkers program 
is below the smallest marginal abatement cost for a NGV program ($372 /t CO2). Li et al. 
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(2013) improve on Knittel’s (2009) methodology by counterfactually estimating sales of 
new vehicles without the CfC program using a difference in difference estimator. They find 
lower abatement costs for the CfC program ($92/ t CO2 - $288/ t CO2). These results 
highlight the cost ineffectiveness of programs designed to reduce CO2 emissions by 
increasing NGV conversions. 
In comparison to programs targeted at reducing emissions from the light-duty 
vehicle fleet are programs that focus on other aspects of CO2 emissions. For example, 
cap and trade systems, such as that proposed in the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act. The EPA’s analysis (2009) of the bill projected the allowance price of CO2 to be 
$17/tCO2 -$22 /t CO2 in 2020.  
5.8. Conclusion 
At first appearances, the price decline in natural gas seems to indicate NGVs are 
a natural stopgap technology for abating CO2 in the light-duty fleet. Natural gas appears 
to be a cheaper cleaner fuel than traditional gasoline. However, further investigations 
reveal that because of the chemical properties of natural gas, the emissions in the light-
duty fleet are necessarily inelastic with respect to the NGV adoption rate. This inelastic 
behavior is expected for a stopgap abatement technology. The initial purchase price of a 
natural gas vehicle makes them infeasible, when compared to traditional fuel vehicles, for 
many consumers. The infeasibility of NGVS mutes the adoption rate, and compounds the 
inelastic emissions.  
Programs designed to increase the adoption of natural gas vehicles can only 
address the infeasibility problem. The inelastic emissions represent a physical constraint 
for policy maker which is imposed by the laws of chemistry. Policymakers must also 
96 
 
combat the perverse effects that their policies have on consumers. The positive effects 
associated with these policies often balance out with the unintended effects. The income 
effects associated with these policies are known as rebound effects. In the case of a tax 
(subsidy), these rebound effects will decrease (increase) emissions. Taxes on gasoline 
and subsidies on natural gas also encourage adoption of natural gas vehicles. This 
adoption represents a substitution effect which will increase (decrease) the emissions 
associated with the policy. 
Combining the inelastic nature of the emissions with respect to adoption, and the 
tendency for the opposing effects of the income and substitution effects causes the 
apparent advantages of using NGVs as a stopgap abatement technology evaporate. 
Comparing these meager reductions in emissions to other abatement technologies serves 
to confirm that NGVs are an inefficient abatement technology. Other programs of CO2 
abatement are far more cost effective than encouraging consumers to purchase NGVs.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Summary of Research 
The main question asked in this dissertation was “Does it make sense to use 
natural gas as a transportation fuel?” In the preceding chapters, I have investigated the 
relationship between the prices of oil and natural gas, the effect that liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) has had on the international trade of natural gas, calculated the percentage of the 
population that would find natural gas a financially advantageous fuel for their 
transportation needs, and the effect that subsidizing natural gas as a transportation fuel 
would have on the environment via CO2 abatement. The main conclusion that we may 
draw from these studies is that natural gas is very rarely an economically advantageous 
transportation fuel.  
In the first chapter of this dissertation the relationship between the price of oil and 
the price of natural gas was examined. This relationship is key to the use of natural gas 
as a transportation fuel because the main advantage that natural gas has over 
conventional fuels is that it is cheaper than those fuels. However, historically the price of 
natural gas and oil on an energy density basis has been more or less at parity. It has only 
been recently that these prices have “decoupled” for a protracted period of time. The main 
results of this chapter indicate that the price relationship of natural gas and oil entered a 
period of instability early in 2014. This instability indicates that natural gas may not retain 
its price advantage over conventional fuels. A loss of this price advantage would devastate 
the attractiveness of natural gas as a transportation fuel.  
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The next chapter of the dissertation looked at the use of LNG as a technology that 
reduces the transportation costs of natural gas. The natural gas industry has historically 
been segregated into various regional markets due to the fact that natural gas is difficult 
to transport because it is in a gaseous state. The ability to liquefy natural gas allows it to 
be transported in a similar manner to other fuels, primarily oil. This chapter showed that 
LNG has contributed to the de-regionalization of the natural gas market, and that the 
natural gas market is transforming into a truly global market. This transformation leads to 
a global price of natural gas that may contribute to the erosion of the price differences 
between natural gas and oil. This chapter only put forth one of many possible explanations 
for why the price of natural gas and oil may have become decoupled in recent years, since 
the price of natural gas is less dependent on the price stability of natural gas across 
different regions. However, one should be careful to note that the price of natural gas will 
not necessarily diverge from the price of oil because of separate global markets. The 
prices may yet converge again in the future due to the price of fuels being governed by 
their relative energy densities. 
The third main chapter of this dissertation focused primarily on a micro-level 
behavior of consumers whereas the previous two chapters focused on the macro-forces 
that shape the natural gas market. In this chapter, the financial advantages of natural gas 
were compared to the main financial disadvantage of natural gas as a transportation fuel 
which is the cost of a vehicle that can run on natural gas. The model presented in this 
chapter could generalize to other alternative fuel vehicles. The analysis showed that 
natural gas vehicles at baseline parameter values are only financially advantageous for 
about 0.1% of the population, which is close to the currently observed rate of adoption. 
The low predicted adoption rate is driven primarily by the fact that the initial cost of the 
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vehicle is not justified by the cost savings over the typical length of ownership of a vehicle. 
Therefore, this chapter answers the main question posed in this dissertation, namely that 
it rarely makes sense to use natural gas as a transportation fuel for most consumers. 
A possible redeeming quality of natural gas (CH4) comes from its benefit to the 
environment. It is a less carbon intensive fuel. Therefore, when combusted it creates less 
CO2 pollution than more traditional transportation fuels like octane (C8H18). Therefore even 
though most individuals would not choose to drive a Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
vehicle due to its up-front expense, governments might want to incent individuals to 
purchase these vehicles to abate emissions of Greenhouse gases. The final chapter of 
this dissertation examined the costs of such a program utilizing the model from the 
previous chapter. Counterfactual policy regimes were simulated to estimate the marginal 
abatement of CO2 via CNG adoption. Perverse incentives lead, in one policy regime, to a 
backwards-bending marginal abatement cost curve. In all cases, the marginal abatement 
costs due to CNG vehicle adoption is orders of magnitude greater than the marginal 
abatement costs associated with other programs designed to abate CO2. These results 
suggest that governments that wish to subsidize CNG vehicles (either directly via 
subsidies or indirectly through tax incentives) on the grounds that it will reduce GHG 
emissions could find better investments than CNG vehicles to reduce pollution. 
6.2. Limitations and Extensions 
Some limitations of this dissertation include that the inconvenience premium that 
we use is a derived measure from a study done almost 20 years ago (Walls, 1996). This 
value is pivotal to obtain the results in both of the last two chapters. Although with an 
inflation adjusted value of this parameter the model does produce estimates that are 
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consistent with observational data, this  value is highly suspect in that is derived from an 
old estimate. For example, consumer preferences may have changed; infrastructure 
availability may be different from what it was in 1996; and technology may have advanced 
in ways that make CNG powered cars less inconvenient than in the past. The results of 
chapter 4 are the most sensitive to this parameter value. Deviations in this value may 
radically alter the main conclusion of this dissertation.  
Additionally, the results of this dissertation critically depend on a fairly stable 
relationship between natural gas and oil. Although in chapter two the concept of the 
stability of different regimes was tested, a permanent break in the price of oil and natural 
gas where the two commodities are no longer co-integrated may cause large differences 
in the price differential between gasoline and natural gas. Historically the price differential 
has been fairly stable with relatively few regime changes, these co-integrating 
relationships may fade over time. However, I find this limitation to be fairly minor. The fact 
that natural gas and oil are close substitutes that differ mainly in physical state (gaseous 
and liquid respectively) and in energy density suggests that the co-integrating relationship 
will most likely persist into the future, even if the co-integrating relationship itself remains 
unstable switching between regimes as in chapter 2.  
The conclusions that NGVs are not financially advantageous for most individuals 
and therefore not going to be adopted very much relies on an estimate of the joint 
distribution of vehicle miles travelled and fuel efficiency which comes essentially from a 
census of U.S. vehicles. This means that these results are limited to that population. In 
other countries this distribution may be different and there is no reason to believe that 
these results will generalize well to other locations. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
believe that the nature of this distribution will remain constant for the United States. The 
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fleet may become more or less fuel efficient as preferences for vehicles change. 
Preferences may change for travel distances as commuters find their commute more or 
less onerous. The results of this dissertation therefore may not generalize to future time 
periods as well. 
On a subtler note, this joint distribution was measured simply as a histogram. No 
distributional assumptions were made, and the distribution was not parameterized. 
Furthermore, the distribution was used as measured, on the assumption that the 
distribution was representative of the population of vehicles. The conclusions drawn 
therefore rely on the ability for this sample distribution to proxy for the population 
distribution.  
Possible extensions of the research presented in this dissertation include 
deepening the understanding of the relationship between the price of oil and natural gas. 
Although much work has been done in this area the true nature of the co-integrating 
relationship remains contentious (Brown & Yücel, 2009; Neumann, 2009). Namely, does 
oil mediate the price of natural gas? The first main chapter of this dissertation sought to 
clarify whether the prices of these two commodities decoupled which are not well 
understood (Ramberg & Parsons, 2012). Specifically, in this chapter I check for the 
decoupling of these prices in the sense of whether a temporary or permanent regime 
change had occurred. The results of this study suggest that the so called decoupling of oil 
and natural gas may be temporary. 
The research in chapter two may be extended to include variables of extreme 
weather events. Specifically, an understanding of how the trade of natural gas is affected 
by the extreme weather events in the importing and exporting countries differ. Such a 
study 0f the trade of natural gas would need to consider heterogeneity of countries 
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weather stations, proximity of weather stations to population centers, and modelling 
potential asymmetric responses to extremes in heat and extremes in cold as natural gas 
could be used in the generation of heat and cold. I am not aware of any studies that 
examine the global pattern of trade of natural gas with respect to weather in such a 
detailed way. 
One of the main drawbacks of the final two chapters is the reliance on the estimate 
of the inconvenience premium. A simple direct extension of this research could be 
performed by estimating the modern inconvenience premium via choice experiment 
methods (Train, 2009). Choice experiments can be used to estimate the marginal 
willingness to pay for different attributes of the choices. The marketing literature refers to 
these types of choice experiments as conjoint analysis. This type of analysis could be 
used to discover the negative willingness to pay for the disutility of various aspects of 
NGVs discussed in chapter 4. From these estimates one would be able to construct a 
measure the inconvenience premium that must be paid to operate an NGV. 
Furthermore, in the last chapter the notion of pollution was abstracted to an ideal 
reaction of fuel. A straight forward application of the costs of the pollution abatement model 
in this chapter is to look at the emissions of other pollutants other than CO2. CO2 
abatement may not be the ultimate goal of policy makers; rather reductions of airborne 
particulate matter may be the goal in promoting NGVs. In this case, the model in the final 
chapter could be modified to assess the cost effectiveness of other pollutants. 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation answers the question aimed mainly at policy makers. The 
question is whether or not policy makers should encourage the adoption of NGVs. The 
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stakes for incorrectly assessing the future role of NGVs in the vehicle fleet could be 
substantial for policy makers. Incorrect decisions could result in substantial investment in 
infrastructure which would be underutilized in a low adoption scenario or not enough 
infrastructures to satisfy demand in a high adoption scenario. Likewise, incentives for 
consumers to purchase NGVs may be more or less generous than is necessary for goals 
to offset pollution at the rates that policy makers wish. Indeed, a thorough understanding 
of the adoption rates of NGVs is necessary to develop relevant and cost efficient policies 
towards NGVs. 
The work embodied in this dissertation finds that the answer of whether or not 
policy makers should encourage the adoption of NGVs is no. The price advantage that 
natural gas has over conventional fuels is unstable and may not persist. NGV adoption is 
likely to be low without price supports. GHG abatement through NGVs is also very costly. 
For these reasons NGVs seem to be a poor investment for policy makers. 
The dissertation fills a small gap in the academic literature as well. Specifically, 
each chapter fills in a different portion of the gap. The first two chapters look at the macro-
market for natural gas to provide a backdrop for the next two chapters.  The last two 
chapters specifically answer the main research question of this dissertation.  
The first chapter looks into the relationship between the price of oil and natural gas. This 
relationship has been explored by various researchers attempting to determine if the price 
of oil and natural gas have become decoupled from each other. Various researchers have 
found that the price of natural gas is governed by the price of oil (Brown & Yücel, 2008; 
Mohammadi, 2011; Regnard & Zakoïan, 2011). However, Ramberg and Parsons (2012) 
show that much of the volatility between the long-run relationship between oil and natural 
gas can be accounted for by allowing for structural breaks in the cointegration relationship. 
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In a similar vein this chapter looks for structural breaks in the relationship between oil and 
natural gas by using a recursive Gregory-Hansen test (Gregory & Hansen, 1996). 
The next chapter looks at the question of whether or not a single global market is 
emerging for natural gas, or if it will continue to be governed by the oil market. This study 
fits into the literature concerned with price integration between regional natural gas 
markets and the role that LNG has played in this integration (Brown & Yücel, 2009; 
Neumann, 2009; Neumann, Siliverstovs, & von Hirschhausen, 2006; Siliverstovs, 
L’Hégaret, Neumann, & von Hirschhausen, 2005). However, the key difference between 
the model presented in this chapter and this vein of literature is the novel use of the gravity 
model to determine the role that LNG plays in the global natrual gas market. This chapter 
concluded that natural gas markets are becoming less regional and that a separate global 
natural gas market is emerging (Jensen, 2004) due primarily to trade in LNG. 
The next chapter answers the question of what types of adoption rates can be 
expected for NGV vehicles amongst consumers. This chapter contributes to the set of the 
literature that deals with the adoption of NGVs. Staub (2013) gives an overview of the use 
of natural gas in transportation. Deal (2012) studies the conditions under which firms 
would be willing to adopt NGVs. Walls (1996) values various attributes unique to natural 
gas. Matic (2005) looks at the opportunities to use natural gas as a transportation fuel. 
This chapter contributes to this literature by predicting the adoption rate of NGVs by 
consumers under different price conditions. The main findings of this chapter are that 
adoption rates are low and will likely continue to be low. 
The final chapter examines the question of whether policy makers should 
encourage the adoption of NGVs to reduce GHG emissions. Specifically, this chapter 
narrowly focuses on CO2 emissions. It is similar to other studies that estimate the marginal 
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abatement cost of CO2 under various abatement mechanisms. For example, Li, Linn, and 
Spiller (2013) and Knittel (2009) investigate the marginal abatement cost of cash for 
clunkers. Kok, Annema, and van Wee (2011) and Kesicki (2012) find the marginal 
abatement cost for electric vehicles. And Bernesteanu and Li (2011) look at hybrid electric 
vehicles. This chapter finds that in comparison to these studies NGVs have a marginal 
abatement cost that are orders of magnitude greater than these studies. This indicates 
that NGVs are an inefficeint CO2 abatement technology. 
In summary, NGVs may seem like a good idea on the surface. The market for 
natural gas appears to be becoming less dependent on oil to regulate its prices. 
Furthermore, the natural gas market is becoming The lower fuel costs make them 
attractive; plus, they are a lower emissions alternative fuel vehicle. However, these 
redeeming qualities do not make up for the larger upfront cost to purchase or convert the 
vehicle for most consumers. In order for policy makers to realize the benefits from lower 
emissions, large incentives are needed to encorage adoption. The large incentives 
required make natural gas an inefficient abatement technology. Therefore, natural gas 
vehicles will most likely continue to make up a small portion of the vehicle fleet.   
6.4. References 
Beresteanu, A. and Li, S. 2011. Gasoline prices, government support, and the demand for 
hybrid vehicles in the United States. International Economic Review 52(1): 161-
182. 
Brown, S.P. and Yücel, M.K. 2008. What drives natural gas prices. The Energy Journal 
29(2), 45-60. 
Brown, S.P. and Yücel, M.K. 2009. Market arbitrage: European and North American 
natural gas prices. The Energy Journal 30(Special Issue), 167-186. 
Deal, A.L. 2012. What set of conditions would make the business case to convert heavy 
trucks to natural gas?–A case study. Unpublished manuscript. 
109 
 
Gregory, A.W. and Hansen, B.E. 1996. Residual-based tests for cointegration in models 
with regime shifts. Journal of Econometrics 70(1), 99-126. 
Jensen, J.T. 2004. The development of a global LNG market. Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies.Retrieved From https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/NG5-
TheDevelopmentofAGlobalLNGMarketIsItLikelyIfSoWhen-JamesJensen-
2004.pdf   
Kesicki, F. 2012. Intertemporal issues and marginal abatement costs in the U.K. transport 
sector. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 17(5): 418-
426. 
Knittel, C.R. 2009. The implied cost of carbon dioxide under the Cash for Clunkers 
program. Available at SSRN 1630647. 
Kok, R., Annema, J.A., and van Wee, B. 2011. Cost-effectiveness of greenhouse gas 
mitigation in transport: A review of methodological approaches and their impact. 
Energy Policy 39(12), 7776-7793. 
Li, S., Linn, J., and Spiller, E. 2013. Evaluating “Cash-for-Clunkers”: Program effects on 
auto sales and the environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 65(2): 175-193. 
Matic, D. 2005. Global opportunities for natural gas as a transportation fuel for today and 
tomorrow. Report of the International Gas Union Study Group 5: 1-147. 
Mohammadi, H. 2011. Long-run relations and short-run. Applied Economics 43:129-137. 
Neumann, A. 2009. Linking natural gas markets-Is LNG doing its job? The Energy Journal 
30(Special Issue), 187-200. 
Neumann, A., Siliverstovs, B., and von Hirschhausen, C. 2006. Convergence of European 
spot market prices for natural gas? A real-time analysis of market integration using 
the Kalman Filter. Applied Economics Letters 13(11): 727-732.  
Ramberg, D. and Parsons, J. 2012. The weak tie between natural gas and oil prices. The 
Energy Journal 33(2): 13-35. 
Regnard, N. and Zakoïan, J.M. 2011. A conditionally heteroskedastic model with time-
varying coefficients for daily gas. Energy Economics 33, 1240-1251. 
Siliverstovs, B., L’Hégaret, G., Neumann, A.,  and von Hirschhausen, C. 2005. 
International market integration for natural gas? Energy Economics 27: 603-615. 
Silva, J.S., Santos, M.C., Tenreyro, S., and Windmeijer, F. 2015. Testing competing 
models for non-negative data with many zeros. Journal of Econometric Methods 
4(1): 29-46. 
Silva, J.S. and Tenreyro, S. 2006. The log of gravity. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 88(4), 641-658. 
 
110 
 
Silva, J.S. and Tenreyro, S. 2011. Further simulation evidence on the performance of the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator. Economics Letters 112(2): 220-
222. 
Sorrell, S. and Dimitropoulos, J. 2008. The rebound effect: Microeconomic definitions, 
limitations and extensions. Ecological Economics 65(3): 636-649. 
Staub, J. 2013. U.S. natural gas production and use in transportation: Annual energy 
outlook 2013. Proceedings of Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting 
Session 843. Washington, DC. 
Train, K.E. 2009. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge university press.  
Walls, M.A. 1996. Valuing the characteristics of natural gas vehicles: An implicit markets 
approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78: 266-276. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
APPENDIX 
EXPENDITURE MINIMIZATION 
 
This appendix lays out a consumer utility model from which the first order condition 
is equation 5 of the model in chapter 4. 
The consumer must choose to minimize his expenditure subject to a utility target. 
This is equivalent to the consumer’s utility maximization problem. However, due to the 
complicated nature of the budget constraint, I find that it is easier to illustrate that equation 
5 of chapter 4 is a first order condition for this model by minimizing expenditure rather than 
maximizing utility. 
The expenditure function that the consumer must minimize is: 
(A-1)  (1 − 𝜑) (𝑉𝑔
∗ + ∑ 𝑝𝑔(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 ) + 𝜑 (𝑉𝑐
∗ + ∑ 𝑝𝑐(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 ), 
where all of the variables are defined as they were in Chapter 4.  The only new variable is 
𝜑. 𝜑 is defined as the share of gasoline vehicle use and is therefore bound on the unit 
interval. This expression gives the expenditure for the consumer. Therefore the 
consumer’s expenditure minimization problem can be expressed as: 
(A-2)  
min
𝜑
(1 − 𝜑) (𝑉𝑔
∗ + ∑ 𝑝𝑔(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 ) + (𝑉𝑐
∗ + ∑ 𝑝𝑐(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 )
𝑠. 𝑡.  ?̅? = 𝑢(𝜑)
0 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 1
 
The Kuhn –Tucker conditions for this expression are:  
(A-3)  (𝑉𝑔
∗ − 𝑉𝑐
∗) + ∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐)(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝜆0𝑢
′(𝜑) − 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 = 0  
  ?̅? − 𝑢(𝜑) = 0 
𝜑 ≥ 0, 𝜆1 ≤ 0, 𝜑𝜆1 = 0 
1 − 𝜑 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 ≤ 0, (1 − 𝜑)𝜆2 = 0 
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The first of these conditions is equivalent to equation 5 from chapter 4. From these 
conditions it follows that 
(A-4)  𝜑 = 0 ⇒ (𝑉𝑔
∗ − 𝑉𝑐
∗) + ∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐)(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝜆0𝑢
′(𝜑) < 0 
And  
(A-5)  𝜑 = 1 ⇒ (𝑉𝑔
∗ − 𝑉𝑐
∗) + ∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐)(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝜆0𝑢
′(𝜑) > 0 
Since no restrictions were placed on 𝑢(𝜑) , the value −𝜆0𝑢
′(𝜑)  can represent the 
inconvenience premium discussed in Chapter 4, which as can be seen here is the marginal 
disutility associated with a natural gas vehicle, i.e. 𝑢′(𝜑) < 0. Furthermore, the case where 
𝜑∗  is an interior solution would correspond to a bi-fuel option. We ignore this case, 
because bi-fuel vehicles were not present in our data set. We recognize, however, that 
this case may be of interest to other researchers. Therefore ignoring interior solutions, the 
optimal value for 𝜑∗ is given by the following expression.  
(A-6)  𝜑∗ = {
1,  if (𝑉𝑔
∗ − 𝑉𝑐
∗) + ∑ (𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐)(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑡 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝜆0𝑢
′(𝜑) > 0
0,                          otherwise
 
This final optimal value expression is equivalent to equation 6 of chapter 5. 
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